Appeal against the order of reversion filed.

S. Nainar Sundaram, J.

1. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 796 of 1977 is the appellant in this writ appeal. He was working as a Junior Assistant in. Thockanaickanpalayam Panchayat Union Council on his transfer from Sathia mangalam panchayat Union. While he was so working, it is alleged that he committed serious irregularities and he was suspended pending enquiry. We do not feel obliged to go into the merits of the charges levelled against the appellant in view of the scope of the controversy raised in the writ appeal. Disciplinary action was taken against him by the first respondent in 1976 and it ended in an order of removal from service on 11th June, 1976, passed by the first respondent. The appellant preferred an appeal to the second respondent and the appellant succeeded only in getting the order of punishment modified into one of reversion as a Record Clerk. This order of the second respondent was passed on 23rd December, 1976. Challenging the proceedings of the respondents, the appellant preferred the above the writ petition and Koshal, J., as he then was, who heard the matter dismissed it in limine, pointing out that there is another remedy by way of a civil suit open to the appellant, which he has not availed of and in view of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as it then stood the writ petition could not be entertained. The appellant has preferred the present writ appeal as against the order of the learned Judge.

2. Mr. K.V. Sankaran, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that on the relevant dates, the first respondent had no competency and jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary action and pass the order of removal from service which, however, has been modified in to one of reversion as stated above, and the learned Counsel points out that by virtue of G.O. Ms. No. 1300, R.D. & L.A. the ministerial staff, to which category the appellant admittedly belonged, became government servants from 1st June, 1974, and consequently, the authority to remove them from service, namely, the appointing authority, is only the District Collector concerned. We have been furnished with a copy of the said Government order and we find that this is the factual position. Learned Counsel further draws our attention to G.O. Ms. No. 422, R.D. & L.A., dated 9th March, 1977, which refers to the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 1300, R.D. & L.A., dated 1st April, 1974, and states that in respect of the provincialised staff of the Panchayat Union, the General Rules and the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Ministerial Service shall apply. On the basis of the above materials, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the order passed by the first respondent totally lacked jurisdiction and the section d respondent, by his order, only modified the punishment and hence, it is not proper to put the provisions of Article 226, Clause (3) as it stood in corporated by the 42nd amendment, against the appellant, stating that the appellant has to exhaust an alternative remedy by means of a suit or any other process.

3. As against this submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. O. Chinnaswamy, Additional Government Pleader, submits that there is provision in the concerned rules governing the service of the Panchayat Union Establishment, which provides for a revision to the Director of Rural Development and even the question of lack of jurisdiction or competency can be agitated in such revision and in this view, Article 226, Clause (3) as it stood then, was a bar for the appellant invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is true that Article 226, Clause (3), as it stood then by virtue of the 42nd amendment, states that no petition for the redress of any in jury referred to in Sub-clause (b) or Sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Article 226 shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. But, t