Landlord obtaining possession of another premises after filing of petition for eviction.

S. Nainar Sundaram, J.

1. In this revision, the tenant within the meaning of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVIII of 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is the petitioner. The respondent herein is the landlord within the meaning of the Act, The landlord sought the eviction of the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act on the ground that he required the premises in question, which is non-residential, for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on in a non-residential building not of his own. n spite of the contest by the tenant, the Controller found a warrant to accept the case of the landlord and ordered eviction. The tenant appealed to the appellate authority and the appellate authority did not find a warrant to disturb the order of the Controller and dismissed the appeal. Hence this revision.

2. The findings on the relevant aspects by the two forums below are factual and are concurrent. Realising the limitations of this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in revision, Mr. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the tenant, pressed for interference in revision by adverting to a subsequent event, after the passing of the orders by this appellate authority. This subsequent event has arisen this way. The premises in question in the present revision in Door No. 277, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram. The tenant has sworn to an affidavit on 9th November, 1982, stating that the landlord obtained an order of eviction against the tenant in occupation of another premises, Door No. 277, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram, and has taken delivery of the said premises in execution last month. The landlord has filed a counter affidavit admitting the fact that he has taken delivery of the other premises, Door No. 277, Gandhi Road, but would state that such an event, assuming it is a subsequent one, has not altered the situation and cannot militate against the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Before adverting to the question as to how far the subsequent event has affected the claim of the landlord for possession of the premises in question for his bona fide requirement Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned Counsel for the landlord, wants to stultify the very consideration of the question at the threshold itself by stating that the right to relief must be judged on facts existing on the date of the institution of the proceedings for eviction and the consideration of subsequent events should not be resorted to, to negative the claim of the landlord as they stood but stressed by the facts existing on the date of the initiation of the eviction proceedings. As against this, Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the tenant, would urge that the subsequent event has a fundamental impact on the right of the landlord to have the relief claimed by him and this Court should take cognizance of the subsequent event and mould the reliefs accordingly. Both the counsel relied on case law. Hence it has become incumbent upon this Court to scrutinise them, spell out the principle applicable and adopt the same.

3. The ordinary rule is, the decree is a suit or proceeding should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood on the date of the commencement of the Us. But, where it is demonstrated that by virtue of subsequent events or change in circumstances during the pendency of the lis, the warrant for granting the relief claimed originally has been lost, the Court can definitely take note of the altered circumstances and mould the relief in accordance with the circumstances as they stand at the time when the decree is finally made.

4. Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri (1949) F.C.R. 84 : (1941) 1 M.L.J. (Supp.) 49 : 53 L.W. 373 : A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 5, is the leading case on the point. In the above case, Gwyer, C.J., referred to the following rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Patterson v. State of Alabama (1934) 294 U.S. 600 at 607.

We have frequently held that in the exercise of