The management must establish that the contractor had a valid licence for these workmen and that these workmen were really utilized for the nature of work in respect of which the licence was granted.

1. This Writ Appeal coming on for hearing on Tuesday the 16th, Wednesday the 17th, Thursday the 18th Monday the 29th day of October, 1984. Upon perusing the Grounds of Appeal, the Order of The Honourable Mr. Justice Padmanabhan dated 19th October, 1982 and made in the exercise of the Special Original Jurisdiction of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 4304 of 1981 and all other papers material to this case, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. T. Fenn Walter, Advocate for the Appellant and of Mr. T. S. Gopalan, Advocate for the Respondents No. 1 on 16th October, 1984 and 17th October, 1984 and of Mr. M. R. Narayanaswamy for Mr. T. S. Gopalan Advocate for the First Respondent on the other day and notice taken out to the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 not having been returned either unserved or served and having stood for consideration till this day the Court made the following order :

Case Note:

Labour and Industrial reinstatement - Sections 2 (1), 7, 10, 12, 12 (2) and 23 of Contract Labour Act and Sections 2 and 2A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appeal against Order which quashed direction of Labour Court to reinstate workmen Court accepted managements argument that workmen were under labour contractor and passed impugned Order management failed to establish that contractor had valid licence for these workmen and workmen utilized for work in which license was granted no evidence for labour contract appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT

Shanmukham, J.

This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of Mr. Justice Padmanabhan made in Writ Petition No. 4304 of 1981. The 1st respondent in this appeal came forward with the said writ petition to quash the award passed by the 2nd respondent in I.D. No. 97 of 1979 directing reinstatement of 75 workmen whose services were not requisitioned on and after 16th October, 1978 by the management (1st respondent therein) on the ground that these workers are not their workmen but were only contractor labour provided by the licenced contractor, the 4th respondent herein. The 2nd respondent (Presiding Officer, 2nd Additional Labour Court, Madras) rejected the stand taken by the management, but upheld the contention of the workmen that the 4th respondent herein was not a labour contractor for the management, that the 4th respondent was a mere name-lender and did not hold any requisite licence under The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Ultimately, on such finding, the 2nd respondent directed reinstatement of these 75 workmen with back wages and other attendant benefits. It is this order of the 2nd respondent that was sought to be quashed in W.P. No. 4304 of 1981. In the view of the learned Judge of this Court whose order is appealed against, the conclusion of the Labour Court that the 4th respondent was not really a labour contractor, but was merely acting as a tool in the hands of the management, is not supported either by the pleadings of the parties or by any evidence. According to the learned Judge, there is absolutely nothing to displace the weighty documentary evidence in favour of the management and therefore, he was compelled, to characterise the finding rendered by the Labour Court to the contrary as not only unsupported by any evidence, but also perverse, and to hold the same vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the records. In view of his above conclusion on merits, the learned Judge did not examine the question whether the industrial dispute has been properly raised and whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, as it was unnecessary for him.

2. The contentions of Mr. Fenn Walter advanced on behalf of these 75 workmen are two fold : The first is that on the facts in this case, there is no difficulty in holding that an industrial dispute did arise so as to enable the Government to refer the dispute to the 2nd respondent herein. The other contention is that the learned Judge erred in re-appraising the evidence an