Issue regarding maintainability of the suit raised.

Srinivasan, J.

1. This Second appeal arises out of a suit for eviction filed by the lessor who was a trust against the appellant. Both the Courts below have granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff not only for possession but also for a sum of Rs. 915.80 by way of arrears of rent. The suit was originally filed by the trust represented by its Managing Trustee. When the appeal before the lower appellate Court was pending, respondents 2 to 4 herein filed two applications by one of which they sought to come on record as parties on the footing that they had become the owners of the property by virtue of a registered exchange deed dated 26.5.1982. By the other application the respondents 2 to 4 sought the permission of the Court to be represented by their power of attorney agent by name Raja Madhava Kalanidhi. Both the applications were ordered by the lower appellate Court, and two revision petitions were filed by the present appellant. They were numbered as C.R.P. Nos. 5223 and 5224 of 1983. They were disposed of by a common order dated 11.1.1984 which is in the following terms:

I do not think there is any legal infirmity in the order impleading the respondents herein in A.S. No. 46 of 1981 because the revision petitioner himself raised an objection that the original plaintiff (trust) having sold the property had no Locus Standi to prosecute the appeal. Therefore, rightly, they have been impleaded. However, this alone will not disentitle the revision petitioner from raising the plea that the suit itself is not maintainable since G.O. Ms. No. 2000 granting exemption from the provisions of the Rent Control Act was applicable only to trust. Subject to the above observations, the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs.

2. The lower appellate court confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court, but unfortunately did not take care to specify whether the decree was in favour of the respondents 2 to 4 or not. That is an incidental technical objection raised by learned Counsel for the appellant. The substance of the judgment and decree have to be understood as granting a decree in favour of the respondents 2 to 4 who have become the owners of the property.

3. Four objections are raised by learned Counsel for the appellant/tenant. The first is that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act became applicable to the suit property when the respondents 2 to 4 became the owners thereof. It has to be mentioned that in both the courts below a contention was raised that the plaintiff/trust was not a public charitable trust within the meaning of G.O. Ms. No. 2000, Home, dated 16.8.1976. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued before me also that the trust was not a public Charitable trust and the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act were applicable to the property even at the time of the institution of the suit. A perusal of Ex. A-1, the trust deed, puts the matter beyond doubt that the trust is a public charitable trust which would come within the scope of G.O. Ms. No. 2000, Home, dated 16.8.1976. There is no substance in the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that the trust was not a public trust.

4. Learned Counsel contends that the G.O. is applicable only to buildings owned by a public charitable trust and once the building ceased to be owned by such a trust, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would automatically apply. The lower appellate Court has taken the view that at the time of the institution of the suit the building was owned by a trust and therefore the respondents 2 to 4 could continue the proceedings and execute the decree on account of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am unable to agree with this particular observation of the lower appellate Court. The question whether the Act is applicable to the suit building after it became the property of the respondents 2 to 4 has to