The appropriate Government has the discretion to decide whether a dispute between the employer and his employees should be referred to the Board, court or tribunal.

Srinivasan, J.

1. All the above writ appeals arise out of writ petitioner challenging orders of the State Government refusing to pass orders of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act,' for adjudication. All cases except W.A. 292 of 1987 and 1781 of 1987 fall within the ambit of Section 2-A of the Act arising out of disputes raised by individuals. The common question which requires to be answered is, 'what are the grounds on which the appropriate Government can refuse to refer a dispute for adjudication?'. Though the matter is not res integre, we are obliged to consider it at some length on account of the contentions raised before us, in particular, that the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered recently run counter to its earlier pronouncements.

2. Excepting in W.A. Nos. 255, 292 and 1781 of 1987, in all other matters the Government refused to make reference on the ground that there was fair and proper enquiry by the concerned management and the punishment meted out to the worker concerned was quite appropriate. In W.A. 255 of 1987, the refusal to make reference was on the ground that the writ petitioner was not a workman as defined by the Act, as he was holding a supervisory post on a salary of Rs. 2232.25 p.m. In W.A. 292 of 1987, the dispute relates to closure of a unit and the Government refused to make reference on the footing that the unit was closed because of loss for past four years and that out of 88 workers, 84 persons had accepted the closure and settled their accounts and the remaining four did not have representative capacity. In W.A. 1781 of 1987 the dispute relates to payment of bonus. The Government refused to make reference on the ground that the management had already decided to pay ex-gratia at 8.33 per cent and the provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act shall not apply to the establishment.

3. Mr. Sanjay Mohan appearing for the appellants in W.A. 255, 290, 292, 520, 685, 708, 811, 849 and 1781 of 1987 submitted at the outset that cases falling under Section 2-A of the Act would stand on a different footing from cases not covered by the Section. He contended that the Government is entitled and bound to consider all the relevant circumstances of the case which have a bearing on the merits of the case and decide whether a prima facie case has been made out for reference. He referred in detail to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan (1960-II-LLJ-592) and Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (1964-I-LLJ-351) and submitted that in the case of non-employment of an individual worker, the Government has to consider prima facie whether there was a fair enquiry, whether the charges against the worker were made out and whether the punishment awarded was just. According to learned counsel, the order of the Government refusing to make a reference could be interfered with by Courts only if irrelevant matters are taken into account, if relevant matters are not considered or if the order is vitiated by mala fides. Reference was also made to the decision in Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa (1975-II-LLJ-418) and Prem Kakar v. State of Haryana. Then learned counsel referred to the three recent decisions of the Supreme Court Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India (1985-I-LLJ-93) Ram Avtar v. State of Haryana (1985-II-LLJ-187) and V. Veerarajan v. Government of Tamilnadu (1987-I-LLJ-209) and the decisions of the Division Benches of this Court following them and submitted that the recent decisions of the Supreme Court are rendered by Benches consisting of lesser number of Judges than in State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan (supra) and Bombay Union of Journalists v. State Bombay (supra) and hence they are not binding on this Court. He cited the ruling of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra (1977-I-LLJ-200) for the proposition that the proper course for the High Court is to follow the decision