Appellate authority constituted under the Act has power to condone delay in filing appeal.

V. Balasubrahmanyan, J.

1. The question in this case is whether an appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter called the Rent Control Act has power to excuse the delay in filing an appeal from an order of the Rent Controller. The appellate authority concerned in this ease is Thiru A. Raman, the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, He said that the Rent Control Act gave him no power to excuse any delay in the appeal. He said that the Act was a complete Code in itself. He said that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 had no application to the proceedings before him as an appellate authority under the Kent Control Act.

2. The learned Subordinate Judge is light in thinking that the Rent Control Act is a complete Code. But that, by itself, does not rule out the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Limitation Act, 1963 is a central legislation on a concurrent subject under oar Constitution. It lays down generally the law relating to limitation. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, however, takes note of special or local laws which might prescribe special periods of limitation in a way not found in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) saves these special periods of limitation, by the simple expedient of declaring that all such special periods shall be deemed to have been incorporated in its own Schedule. Having done so, Section 29(2) further provides that to these special periods of limitation prescribed by special and local laws, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall, as a rule, apply except where the special or local law concerned expressly excludes or limits the application of these sections.

3. The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is a special law in the sense that it provides a special machinery for proceedings between landlords and tenants of buildings. It is also a local law because it does not have any force beyond the confines of this State, and even in this State it applies only to certain areas such as cities and municipal towns. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would, therefore, govern the special periods prescribed in this Act. Section 23(1) (b) of our Rent Control Act prescribes a time-limit of 15 days for filing an appeal from an order of the Rent Controller. Neither in Section 23(1) (b) nor elsewhere in the Rent Control Act is there any provision which runs counter to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It, follows, therefore that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal provided under Section 23 of this Act. The question is not whether our Rent Control Act is a complete Code, in the sense that it provides for everything or almost everything. The question is, whether it expressly rules out, either wholly or to any lesser extent, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This is always the approach which Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act demands as respects any special or local law. This is illustrated by another limitation provision in this very Rent Control Act, namely, Section 25(2). This Section prescribes a period of one month as the time limit for a revision to the High Court from an order passed by an appellate authority. Under the proviso to Section 25(2), however, the High Court is empowered to admit a revision beyond the time-limit. But this power of extension is itself subject to the restriction that She High Court cannot extend the time, in any case, beyond one month of the expiry of the period of limitation. This means that whatever might be the cause and however sufficient it might be, the High Court will be powerless to condone the delay beyond one month. There is no such restriction on the Court's power no extend the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 23 and Section 25 of the Rent Control Act thus present a study in contrast. To Section 23, Section 5 of the Limitation Act fully applies, precisely for the reason