Contention of tenant sustained in revision to High Court.

S. Natarajan, J.

1. The petitioner herein unsuccessfully contended before the District Munsif Tiruchirapalli, in E.A. No. 374 of 1979 on the file of his Court that the decree for ejectment passed against him in the above suit was inoperative, inexecutable and null and void. The said petition was filed under Sections 47 and 151, Civil Procedure Code, read with Section 18 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Consequent on the dismissal of the petition the petitioner has approached this Court for reliefs.

2. The facts lie within a narrow compass. The respondent sought ejectment of the petitioner from the house leased out to him and succeeded in obtaining a decree for possession in the above said suit. The petitioner preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 438 of 1974 on the file of the District Court, Tiruchirapalli. During the pendency of the appeal, the town where the suit property is situate was constituted a municipality and automatically the provisions of the Act became applicable to that area. Notwithstanding this fact, the appeal was argued with reference to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. One of the main defences taken by the petitioner in the appeal was that the tenancy had not been properly terminated by issue of a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner's contentions were rejected and the appeal was dismissed. He preferred a second appeal to this Court in Krishnaswami v. Rasheeda S.A. 640 of 1976, and the only question argued in the appeal was about the valid termination of the tenancy. N.S. Rama-swami, J., who heard the second appeal, rejected the contentions of the petitioner and dismissed the second appeal, but nevertheless, gave the petitioner time for one year to vacate the premises. When the said period of one year was nearing completion, the petitioner came forward with the petition, from out of which the revision arises, for declaration that the decree in ejectment passed against him was inoperative, inexecutable and null and void. The principal contention of the petitioner is that consequent on the introduction of the Act to the area where the building is situate, the decree-passed earlier has become inexecutable and therefore, notwithstanding the expiry of the time-limit granted to him in S.A. No. 640 of 1976 be is entitled to be in occupation of the building as a statutory tenant until a valid order of eviction is passed against him under Section 10 of the Act. The learned District Munsif has taken the view that since the Act was introduced subsequent to the filing of the* suit by the landlady, the jurisdiction of the ( sic) Civil Court is not taken away and hence it is not open to the petitioner to question the validity and executability of the decree passed against him. For reaching this conclusion, the learned District Munsif has followed the ratio laid down in Sengalaneer Pilliar Temple, Koranad by its trustee Ambalavana Chettiar v. Manickam Chettiar (1977) 90 L.W. 162.

3. Mr. Peter Francis, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that Section 10 of the Act is clear in its terms and it expressly forbids the eviction of the petitioner, who is a tenant, in any other manner, except in accordance with the provisions of that section or Sections 14 to 16 of the Act and the section further provides that a tenant cannot be evicted even in execution of a decree obtained by the landlord. For appreciating the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to the definition of 'tenant' in the Act and the prescription contained in Section 10 for the eviction of the tenant. Section 2(8) of the Act defines a 'tenant' as follows--

'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who--

(i) in the case of a residential building, had be