JUDGMENT: The appellants in this appeal stand convicted in S.C.No. 231 of 1992 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai for the offence punishable under Sec. 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment together with a fine of Rs.500 carrying a default sentence. Heard Mr.M. Ravindran, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr.V. Jayaprakash Narayanan, learned Government Advocate appearing on the criminal side for the State.

2. The investigating agency had filed the final report directly before the Court of Sessions, thereby treating the Court of Sessions as the original Court empowered to take cognizance of the offence. But recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that the Court constituted under the Act cannot take cognizance of offences under the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act directly without the case being committed to it. The case on hand had it’s origin in the year 1992 and no objection whatsoever had been taken before the learned trial Judge about the absence of power in it to take a cognizance of the offence directly. In a later judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that unless objections are taken at the earliest stage and if no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused on account of such taking cognizance, the judgment cannot be set aside on the sole ground of absence of power to take cognizance of the offence. This later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India governs the fact situation in this case. In fact learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would fairly state that he would not be in a position to press the point of absence of power in the Court of sessions to take cognizance of the offence directly.

3. The crux of the argument of the learned senior counsel for the appellants is that, to constitute an offence under Sec. 3(1)(x) of the Act, the prosecution must show that the accused intentionally insulted or intimidated with an intention to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in any place within “public view”. In elaborating this argument, the learned senior counsel would submit that, the persons insulted or intimidated, as provided for under the sub-section, should be, at the time of such insult or intimation, in any place within “public view”. In this case the said element is lacking and therefore the conviction cannot be sustained. Heard the learned Government Advocate on this point.

4. The word “public view” is not defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word “public” is “Open to the people as a whole”. The dictionary meaning of the word “view” is vision or sight as from a particular position. Reading these two meanings together in the context of the words “public view”, it only means that the public should have viewed the incident irrespective of the place where the offence is committed. The offence may be in a public place within “public view” or in any other place within “public view”. In either situation the essential element that requires to be established is that it was in “public view”. The word “public view” in the Section is preceded by the words “in any place within”. Therefore, it is clear to my mind that insult or intimidation should be in a place within public view. There are a few judgments on this point and they are cited as hereunder:

(a) In Karansingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1992) 3 Crl.L.J. 3054, it was held as follows:

“5. From the material on record in the case diary, further it cannot be said that the incident took place at place within public view. The words used in the provision are in place within”public view“and not in a”public place“. There is clearly a distinction between an incident taking place within, public view and incident taking place within public place. The incident took place at about 11.00 p.m. on the spot and what transpired between them has not bee

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