N.K.Jain, C.J.: This writ appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge, dated 27.10.1999, passed in W.P.No.17370 of 1999, dismissing the writ petition with the observation that it is for the writ petitioner to take appropriate proceedings before the appropriate Court, to evict respondents 2 and 3.

2. It is alleged that on 1.4.1958, by way of a lease deed, the disputed property was leased out by the writ petitioner in favour of M/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co., of India Ltd., for a period of 20 years. The currency of lease was expired on 31.8.1978. The writ petitioner has decided not to grant any further lease, and wanted to put up a building on the said property. It is further alleged that since the undertaking was transferred and vested with the Central Government, the petitioner on 22.9.1977 sent a registered letter to the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., requesting to vacate the premises by the expiry of lease on 31.8.1978, since she was not willing to extend the lease, and in view of her proposed construction in the said property. But the respondents 2 and 3 did not vacate the premises, and as per Secs.5 and 7 of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976 (herein after referred to as the Act) the writ petitioner is bound to renew the lease for a further period of 20 years on the existing rent of Rs.110 per mensem. Thereafter, the writ petitioner sent a letter on 18.1.1978 requesting to surrender the vacant site, but the same was answered negativing the request in the similar terms of the earlier reply. Hence, the writ petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P.No.2691 of 1978 for declaring Sec.5 of the Act, which was subsequently dismissed. Though the lease period expired on 1.6.1998, the respondents on 9.1.1998 issued notice for continuance of occupation for a further period of 20 years from 1.6.1998. Challenging the same, W.P.No.17370 of 1999 has been filed. The learned Single Judge, on consideration, dismissed the writ petition. Against that, the present writ appeal has been filed.

3. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that once the lease period expired on 31.8.1978, and the appellant issued notice showing her intention, deciding not to renew the lease, the attitude of respondents 2 and 3 insisting to remain there, without vacating the premises is nothing but depriving her right to get the vacant premises. Only under the compelling situation and in view of the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., and another v. Dolly Das, J.T. (1999)3 S.C. 61, petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction, but the learned Single Judge without considering the facts and law rejected her prayer. Therefore, the order of the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside.

4. In pursuance of notice, Mr.Dullip Singh for M/s.King and Patridge entered appearance for respondents 2 and 3. The learned counsel submits that the writ petition has been filed against a letter of the second respondent, and not against any order, and therefore, the learned single Judge is right in dismissing the writ petition. That apart, the facts of the case on hand are very much distinguishable from the facts of the case, decided by the Apex Court, cited supra.

5. In rejoinder, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that as per the earlier contract with the burma Shell Company, they can seek second time renewal, but since Sec.5(2) of the Act has been invoked, the contract has become statutory contract, and therefore, after the expiry of the statutory lease period, the respondents 2 and 3 became trespassers, and they cannot say now, to the appellant to go to Civil Court for eviction. The learned senior counsel further submits that the notice issued by the writ petitioner is a notice of termination, and not that of renewal, and therefore, the appellant’s case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court, cited supra, and the appellant is entitled to get the vacant pr

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