R.Jayasimha Babu, J.: The appeal arises from a suit for specific performance. That suit was filed on the basis of an agreement dated 4.7.1974 under which the first defendant in the suit had through her husband and power of attorney holder contracted to sell a house property for a sum of Rs.30,000. Though the trial Court dismissed that suit, that suit has been decreed by the learned single Judge of this Court. The suit had been dismissed by the trial Court even after holding that the agreement was genuine that the defendants had set up a false story that the second defendant had signed the agreement in a stupor induced by consumption of liquor. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the subsequently added defendant who is the appellant before us was a bona fide purchaser for value and, therefore, no decree for specific performance could be passed against him.

2. That subsequent purchase by the appellant was on 5.5.1975, two days after the suit for specific performance was filed, the suit having been filed on 3.5.1975. The trial Court did not consider the applicability of Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act to this transaction. In appeal, the learned single Judge while upholding the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed as though the subsequent purchaser was found to have made the purchase bona fide and for value as also without notice of the agreement, nevertheless his sale was subordinate to the decree that could be made in the suit for specific performance which had been instituted prior to the sale in favour of the subsequent purchaser who is the appellant before us.

3. That finding of the learned single Judge has been assailed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant. It was submitted by him that Sec.19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly and explicitly provides that there can be no decree for specific performance against a person who had subsequently purchased the property for value and had made the purchase bona fide, and further had made the purchase without notice of the agreement sought to be specifically enforced in the suit. Counsel submitted that the sale deed executed by the vendor of the appellant was certainly binding on the vendor and is against the whole world, that the document was supported by consideration and, therefore, in the light of the finding about his not being aware of the prior agreement, the dismissal of the suit should have been affirmed by the learned Judge while exercising appellate jurisdiction.

4. Counsel for the first respondent, who was the plaintiff in the trial Court, submitted that Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act which sets out the principle for lis pendens in sufficiently clear terms sets out as to when a suit is said to be pending. The explanation to Sec.52 pinpoints the time of commencement of the pendency, as the time of the filing of the suit, and inasmuch as the sale in favour of the appellant took place two days after the suit had been filed, the doctrine of lis pendens would be attracted. Counsel in this context relied upon a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt.Ram Peary and others v. Gauri, A.I.R. 1978 All. 318, as also the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.M.S. Investments Ltd. v. V.Veerappan, (2000)1 C.T.C. 538.

5. The Allahabad High Court in its judgment referred to the case of Faiyaz Hussain Khan v. Munshi Prag Narain, (1907)34 I.A. 102, which in term referred to the case of Bellamy v. Sabine, (1857)44 E.R. 842 and the enunciation of the principle of lis pendens by Cranworth, L.C. therein, who observed:

"It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party."

The rights acquired by a purchaser of a property which is the subject matter of litigation in the Court in a suit instituted

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