The presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is rebuttable, and the burden of proof lies on the defendant to show that the promissory note was executed without consideration.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree of the learned subordinate judge, Tindivanam passed in A.S. No.52 of 1986, dated 3. 1987, reversing the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Gingee, dated 112. 1985. The plaintiff is the appellant. The parties will hereinafter be referred as per their rank in the trial court for the sake of convenience. The circumstances which has given rise to this second appeal may be stated briefly as follows:- The plaintiff is the correspondent of St. Annammal School, Cuddalore. He instituted the suit in O.S. No.204 of 1984 for recovery of money with interest, on the allegation that on 17. 1981, the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.3,000 in cash. agreeing to pay interest at 12% per annum and executed a promissory note, Ex.A.1. In spite of several demands, the defendant did not pay any amount. As the defendant is an agriculturist, interest is claimed at 9% per annum. It is also alleged, the defendant is owning more than five acres of wet land and, therefore, he is not entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Acts 13 of 1980 and 50 of 1982. The defendant resisted the suit stating he applied for a teachers job in a school, in which the plaintiff was the correspondent. He demanded a sum of Rs 2,000 to give him the job. Since he had no money and was not in a position to pay the amount, the plaintiff wanted the promissory note, Ex.A.1 which he had executed and no consideration passed. Since no job was given to him, he demanded for the return of the promissory note. When he demanded the return of the promissory note through panchayat and the Teachers association, the plaintiff filed the suit falsely, which is liable to be dismissed.

2. On the above pleadings of the parties, the learned District Munsif, Gingee framed the necessary issues. The plaintiff examined himself and one of the attestors to the promissory note, Ex.A.1 on his side and marked the promissory note as Ex.B.1. The defendant examined himself and two other witnesses to substantiate his contention that the plaintiff is in the habit of demanding money from persons who applied for teachers job in school and when they are not in a position to pay cash immediately he used to get promissory notes from them. He had also marked Exs.B1 to B.8 on his side.

3. During the trial, the defendant admitted that he executed the promissory note, Ex.A1 and the signature found in Ex.A.1 is his signature. Relying on the above and also on the presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short), the trial court rejected the defence raised by the defendant and decreed the suit with costs as prayed for.

4. Aggrieved with the above judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant preferred A.S.No.52 of 1986 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Tindivanam. The first appellate court, on a re-appraisal of the evidence, reached the conclusion that the defendant has rebutted the presumption under section 118 of the Act and the evidence adduced on his behalf, both oral and documentary, proves that no consideration passed for the promissory note Ex.A. 1 and the plaintiff miserably failed to prove his case that he withdrew Rs 3,000 from his account in the State Bank of India and paid the amount of Rs 3,000 to the defendant. The learned first appellate judge also held that the plaintiff took special interest in getting an appointment to the defendant and wrote to the employment exchange Officer, Cuddalore to send his name for consideration. The learned first appellate judge drew an adverse inference against the plaintiff as he was unable to produce the bank pass book and also his account number. Ultimately, the learned first appellate judge reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit, against which the present second appeal has been directed.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff contented that the tria