Partition deed is not admissible in evidence for want of registration.

This second appeal has been directed against the judgment an decree, dated 22. 1988 passed in A.S.No.104 of 1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur reversing the judgment and decree of the Court of the District Munsif, Perambalur dated 17. 1986 made in O.S.No.1809 of 1981.

.2. Theshort facts are:

.The husband of the vendor of the respondent/ plaintiff and the appellants/defendants are brothers. The vendor of the respondent is one Geetha, who is the wife of Kabeerdos. Geetha sold the suit property to the respondent/plaintiff claiming that a partition took place even during the lifetime of her husband and after the death of her husband, she was enjoying the properties. The respondent/plaintiff purchased suit property under Ex.A-2, dated 27. 1981. The respondent/plaintiff claimed after his purchase, he was enjoying the suit property as house by paying the house tax, but during the year 1981, the appellant/defendant attempted to trespass into the suit property, which compelled him to file the suit for a declaration of his title and for a permanent injunction.

.3. The appellants/defendants resisted the suit stating the document, Ex.A-1, dated 4. 1979 is not a memorandum of agreement and the same required registration. Geetha was married to her maternal uncle before she was married to Kabeerdos. The marriage between Geetha and her maternal uncle was subsisting and she married Kabeerdos, his brother and, therefore, she is not the legally wedded wife of Kabeerdos. In short, it is alleged that under the document, Ex.A-1 Geetha, the vendor of the plaintiff did not get any right to the suit property and, therefore, she cannot convey any title to the plaintiff and the suit has to be dismissed.

4. On the above pleadings of the parties, the learned District Munsif, Perambalur formulated the necessary issues. On a consideration of the evidence placed before him, the trial judge reached the conclusion that Ex.A-1 is not the memorandum of agreement, but it is a partition deed under which, rights flowed to the parties and it required registration. As Ex.A-1 has not been registered, the same is not admissible in evidence and ultimately dismissed the suit without costs.

5. The respondent/plaintiff who was aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court preferred A.S.No.104 of 1986 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur. The learned Subordinate Judge, on a reappraisal of the evidence, by his judgment dated 23. 1988 and for the reasons assigned by him, concluded that Ex.A-1 is only a record of transaction which took place earlier and it is only a memorandum of agreement, which did not require registration. Therefore, he reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit with the costs throughout, the correctness of which is being challenged in this second appeal.

6. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration is whether the First Appellate Judge applied the principles of law, relied on by him in the judgment, wrongly without ascertaining the facts of the present case fit into the principles of law and, therefore is perversee

7. Thepoint: The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants strenuously contended the First Appellate Judge had committed a grave error of law in upsetting the judgment of the trial court. It was argued that the recitals in the document, Ex.A-1 or the evidence of the plaintiff P.W.1 and his vendor, P.W.2 does not show that the division of the properties was effected among Duraisamy Chettiar and his sons sometime prior to the date of the document and that Ex.A-1 had been written to record the division of properties already taken place among them. A reading of the recitals in the document, Ex.A-1 would show that he declared an interest in immovable property mentioned that in on the very date it was written, namely, on 4. 1979 and not earlier. In short, it was submitted that the document, Ex.A-1, the execution of which is