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1999 Supreme(Mad) 686
High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M. KARPAGAVINAYAGAM
Mohamad Batcha
Versus
R.Andi Ambalam & Others
C.M.A.No.1001 of 1992 and C.M.P.No.14936 of 1992 and C.M.P.No. 1802 of 1993
Decided On : 26-07-1999
S. Subbiah, for Appellant. K. Jaganathan, for Respondent Nos.1 and 2.S.Shanmugavelayutham, for Respondent No.4.
The court must adopt a liberal approach in interpreting the phrase "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone delay if the explanation is acceptable and does not show mala fide.
Headnote:
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 166 - LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 5 - CONDONATION OF DELAY - PRINCIPLES - DELAY OF 526 DAYS IN FILING PETITION TO SET ASIDE EX PARTE AWARD - EXPLANATION NOT ACCEPTABLE - APPLICATION TO CONDONE DELAY DISMISSED.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, the owner of a tractor involved in an accident that resulted in the death of a 15-year-old boy, filed an application to condone a delay of 526 days in filing a petition to set aside an ex parte award directing him to pay compensation to the deceased's parents. The tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the delay was not properly explained and was filed to drag on the proceedings.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the appellant's explanation for the delay was not acceptable and that he had given false evidence before the tribunal in order to achieve his object of dragging on the matter and causing further delay in making the payment of the award.
Issues: 1. Whether the appellant's explanation for the delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte award was acceptable. 2. Whether the appellant had given false evidence before the tribunal.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the appellant's explanation for the delay was not acceptable because it was contradictory and did not show bona fide. 2. The court held that the appellant had given false evidence before the tribunal because he had stated in his affidavit that he had appeared before the court on a certain date, but in his deposition he stated that he had not appeared on that date.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay costs throughout.
Mohamad Batcha is the appellant herein.
2. The appellant has filed this appeal against the order of the tribunal, dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 526 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte order, directing him to pay the compensation of Rs.34,560 to the claimants respondents 1 and 2 for the death of their son in the accident occurred due to the negligent driving of the driver of the tractor belonging to the appellant.
.3. Mathim alias Ilamathi, aged about 15 years, was working under I.Mohamed Batcha,
.the appellant herein, by assisting him in carrying water by the tractor belonging to him.
4. On 20.6.1986 at about 4 p.m., when the driver of the tractor and the deceased were engaged in the course of carrying water for irrigating ‘thopes’, the driver drove the tractor in a rash and negligent manner. In view of the rash driving, the deceased, who was sitting in the tractor, was thrown off and right front wheel of the tractor ran over the boy and caused severe multiple injuries on him. He was taken to the Government Rajaji Hospital. Madurai and at 10 p.m. he died.
5. The parents, Andi Ambalam and Irulayee, the respondents 1 and 2 herein, filed a petition, seeking for compensation of Rs.1,00,000 from the owner of the tractor, the appellant herein and the insurance company. Both the respondents therein, the owner of the Tractor and insurance company, filed their respective counters.
6. After enquiry, the tribunal exonerated the insurance company, but directed the owner of the Tractor, the appellant herein, to pay compensation of Rs.34,560 as against the total compensation of Rs.1,00,000 claimed by the parents of the deceased.
7. After nearly about one and half years, the appellant filed a petition before the tribunal to condone the delay of 526 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte award earlier passed.
8. After notice to the parties, the enquiry was conducted by the tribunal in the said petition. The appellant was examined in chief and cross. Thereupon, the tribunal heard the counsel for the parties and considered the materials and rejected the petition to condone the delay mainly on the ground that the delay was a huge one and not properly explained and that the same was filed, in order to drag on the proceedings and to escape from liability.
9. Having aggrieved over this order, the appellant, the owner of the tractor, which was involved in the accident, is before this Court through this appeal.
.10. Mr.S.Subbiah, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would mainly contend that the explanation given for the delay is an acceptable one and the tribunal ought to have taken a liberal approach in condoning the delay and that the request to condone the delay should not have been rejected merely on the reason that it was huge delay.
11. Mr.Jaganathan, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, respondents 1 and 2 herein, has supported the impugned order in his submission and requested this Court to confirm the same, as it contains valid reasons to reject the prayer to condone the delay.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant would elaborately argue on the strength of the decisions reported in N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy , (1998)7 S.C.C. 123 and Sonerao Sadashivrao Patil in order to substantiate the plea that the length of the time cannot be taken as a relevant factor in considering the condonation of delay, as the term “sufficient cause” should be interpreted and construed liberally and the discretion vested with the tribunal has got to be exercised to advance substantial justice.
13. On going through the decisions cited supra, it is clear that the principles relating to the matter of condonation of delay are well settled. The court is armed with power to condone the delay. The judicial power and the discretion are given to the court to advance substantial justice. If the spiri
