1998 Supreme(Mad) 62
High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.M. ABDUL WAHAB
K.Nachimuthu
Versus
A. Natarajan
S.A.No.936 of 1985
Decided On : 22-01-1998
Mahaboob Sheriff for Appellant. K. Yamunan, for Respondent.
Defendant is the appellant in second appeal.
.2. The plaintiff filed the suit for injunction in respect of item No. 1 in ‘A’ schedule property and the properties covered by ‘B’ schedule and also prayed for possession with respect to item No.2 in ‘A’ schedule. According to the plaintiff, the properties were obtained by him by way of partition and by way of will executed by one of his brothers. After the suit for partition, the will was executed and pursuant to the will, he has taken possession of the properties allotted to him as well the property allotted to his brother, who executed the will in his favour. The defendant was permitted to live as a licensee under the plaintiff and also permitted to use the plaintiff’s tiled house and two huts in old S.No.90/2A for a short time till he find suitable accommodation in its place. Thereafter the defendant became a tenant under one Varadharajan, one of the other brothers. The plaintiff did not lease the tiled house to the defendant. He is a tenant with respect to the land belonging to the other brother Varadharajan. There is some misunderstanding between the plaintiff and the other brother Varadharajan. The defendant is neither a tenant of the land nor is entitled to any right under Kudieruppu Act. On the other hand, he is a lorry owner running a transport service in the name and style of K.N.K. Transport. On 22.4 1978, the defendant dug a pit in front of the house, when objected, he attempted to trespass into the ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties and harvested the crops. Hence, the suit has been filed.
3. The defendant contended that at the time of partition, the plaintiff was only a minor and he never raised the crop. It is also not correct to state that he has got possession of ‘B’ schedule property pursuant to the will. Plaintiff was never in possession of the land. Perumal Chettiar was managing the entire properties. With the consent of the sharers, the defendant came to be in possession of the lands belonging to the other sharers. Hence, he is entitled to the rights under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act and Kudieruppu Confirmation of Ownership Act. He has also reconstructed the tiled house at a considerable cost. He has also provided electricity etc.
4. On a consideration of the facts, the trial court has dismissed the suit. It has found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the land. The defendant, is in possession of the properties as a tenant.
5. On appeal, the appellate court has reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court. It has reversed the finding of the trial court by holding that the trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant was a cultivating tenant simply because the plaintiff has expressed ignorance with regard to certain facts. According to the lower appellate court, the defendant has failed to prove that he was a cultivating tenant.
.6. From the discussion by the courts below, it is clear that the main issue involved in this case is as to whether the defendant is a cultivating tenant or not.
7. The lower appellate court has found that the defendant is not a cultivating tenant. It is also now represented that even though there was an order in favour of the defendant by the Tahsildar, declaring him as a cultivating tenant, subsequently the same has been set aside by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the matter was remitted back to the Tahsildar for fresh disposal. The matter is pending before the Tahsildar.
8. In a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Periathambi Gounder v. District Revenue Officer, A.I.R. 1980 Mad 180, the scope of Sec. 16-A Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act has been considered and Their Lordships have observed as follows:
"...the interdict is one of the jurisdiction of the matters which by or under the Act have to be determined by the Record Officer, the District Collector or other officer or authority empowered by the Act. The section itself does not e