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1998 Supreme(Mad) 921
High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVARAJ PATIL & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. V. BALASUBRAMANIAN
JAYAKODI JACOB D.
Versus
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT
W.A.No.992 of 1996
Decided On : 14-07-1998
An employee cannot withdraw their option for voluntary retirement once it has been accepted by the employer.
Headnote:
VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT SCHEME - WITHDRAWAL OF OPTION - RIGHT TO WITHDRAW - INTERPRETATION OF VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT SCHEME - EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO WITHDRAW OPTION BEFORE ACCEPTANCE - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 2(K) - SECTION 10(1)(C) - SECTION 25F - SECTION 25G.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a Clerical Assistant, opted for voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) introduced by the respondent-Management. However, he later sought to withdraw his option for voluntary retirement. The respondent-Management refused to allow the withdrawal, and the appellant received VRS compensation and other benefits. The appellant then raised an industrial dispute, which was rejected by the Labour Court and the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the appellant's option for voluntary retirement could not be equated to resignation, and that he was not entitled to withdraw his option once it had been accepted by the respondent-Management. The Court also held that the appellant's case could not be equated to retrenchment, as he had voluntarily retired and received all the benefits flowing from the VRS.
Issues: 1. Whether an employee can withdraw their option for voluntary retirement before it is accepted by the employer? 2. Whether the appellant's case could be equated to retrenchment?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that an employee cannot withdraw their option for voluntary retirement once it has been accepted by the employer. The Court reasoned that the VRS was a scheme that was mutually beneficial to both the employer and the employee, and that allowing employees to withdraw their options after they had been accepted would undermine the scheme. 2. The Court held that the appellant's case could not be equated to retrenchment, as he had voluntarily retired and received all the benefits flowing from the VRS.
Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ appeal, upholding the order of the Labour Court and the learned single Judge.
( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties.
( 2 ) THE unsuccessful writ petition challenging the validity and correctness of the Award dated January 12, 1994 made by the first respondent Labour Court in I. D. No. 438 of 1992, has filed this writ appeal challenging the order dated September 1, 1995 made by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 7841 of 1995. 2-A. The facts briefly stated which are relevant and necessary for the disposal of this writ appeal, are the following :-The appellant was working as a Clerical Assistant in the employment of the respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 introduced the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (V. R. S.) from the First Appeal 1987 under which Clerical Assistants could opt for voluntary retirement from service receiving certain monetary compensation and benefits. The appellant gave a letter opting voluntary retirement on March 31, 1987 (according to the respondent No. 2 Management, application for voluntary retirement was given in February, 1987 ). The appellant submitted a letter on April 1, 1987 withdrawing the letter dated March 31, 1987 giving option for voluntary retirement. Thereafter, the appellant wrote one more latter on April 27, 1987 reiterating his stand for withdrawal of option given by him for voluntary retirement. The 2nd respondent by its letter dated May 18, 1987 stated that the request of the appellant could not be considered as all the accounts of the appellant had been settled. The appellant received received V. R. S. compensation of Rs. 50,000/- on August 19, 1987 and he made a request on the same day for issue of service certificate. The service certificate was issued on August 20, 1987. Since the appellant did not accept the gratuity amount, documents were sent to the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, which amount also the appellant received later; of course stating that without prejudice to claim higher amount. The appellant also made a request to the second respondent seeking fresh appointment on June 7, 1989. The second respondent gave a reply on June 21, 1989 that it was not possible to give a fresh employment. It is, thereafter, on June 13, 1991 the appellant herein raised I. D. No. 403 of 1991, in Madurai Labour Court which was subsequently renumbered as I. D. No. 438/1992 on the file of Labour Court, Tirunelveli. The Labour Court in the light of the materials placed before Court, both oral and documentary, rejected the claim of the appellant in regard to his non-employment by its order dated January 12, 1994 for the reasons stated therein. The appellant was not happy with the said order of the Labour Court, i. e. the first respondent herein, and filed Writ Petition No. 7841 of 1995 against the said order. The learned single Judge of this Court by the order impugned in this writ petition, dismissed the writ petition not finding any error in the order passed by the Labour Court. The matter did not rest at that. That appellant has filed this appeal challenging the order of the learned single Judge.
( 3 ) BEFORE us, the learned counsel for the appellant strongly contended that the case of the appellant could be equated to one of resignation given by the employee and that the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge ought to have appreciated that even before the acceptance of option given by the appellant opting voluntary retirement, he had every right to withdraw the same as sought in the letter dated April 1, 1987, submitted on the very next day; the second respondent did not intimate that the voluntary retirement opted by the appellant was accepted and it also did not give reasons for refusing to allow withdrawal of Voluntary Retirement Scheme pursuant to the letter dated April 1, 1987 given by the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant took pains to explain that the case of the appellant at least can be put at par on the retrenchment of an employee. The submission he made in this context was that the appellant had accepted the V. R. S. c
