Sufficient cause not shown for condonation of delay.

C. Shivappa, J.

1. The petitioner herein, namely, The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, has challenged the order passed in O.P. No. 274 of 1991 dated 19. 1991. The grievance of the petitioner is that the learned Judge has no jurisdiction to interfere with the case of the consent award modifying the interest portion from 19% to 12% and that he has erred in not granting interest for the pre- reference period and restricting the interest claim only from the date of the award.

2. Along with the Memorandum of Appeal, the petitioner herein has filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 64 days in filing the appeal.

3. It is a general principle in the relevant rules/Statutes that an action against a judgment must be brought promptly when once the aggrieved party becomes aware of the existence of the judgment against him. Where the party is not under disability when he was aware of the judgment, the running of the time will not be suspended and a right is going to be created if the time stipulated expires. The time within which the action may be brought is to be measured from the date on which the aggrieved party had the knowledge of the judgment and also to weigh the nature of the disability that prevented him to invoke the jurisdiction questioning the judgment. If the explanation offered is unsustainable and when a right is created in favour of the party in whose favour the judgment is there, the right cannot be taken away by a delayed action.

.4. While dealing with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing appeal, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations, as held in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, viz. the expiration of limitation for filing the appeal gives rise to a legal right in favour of the other party and such legal right should not be light-heartedly disturbed; and secondly, the discretion given to the Court to condone such delay ought to be exercised so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction nor want of bonafides is imputable to the appellant. The period for preferring an appeal cannot be extended simply because the appellants case is hard and calls for sympathy, nor will the Courts extend the period of limitation merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. A Court granting indulgence must be satisfied that there was diligence on the part of the appellant and that he was not guilty of any negligence what so ever. Ofcourse, Court should not be too strict as it might well defeat the ends of justice. Where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay having regard to the position of the party that too, when it is a corporation having assistance of best of men to conduct its affairs, should not be condoned as it amounts to a case of discretion not being exercised judicially. If there is no support by any evidence adduced for delay, the application therefor ought to be rejected. The word "sufficient cause" cannot be construed liberally merely because the party in default is the Government or an institution. In order to take a practical view of the working of a Government or an institution to the slow motion process of its wheels, there must be sufficient explanation from the source at which the delay occurred and the reasons for such delay. In the absence of satisfactory explanation of the delay by the institution the delay need not be condoned. "Sufficient cause" must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section. A cause for delay, which a party could have avoided by the exercise of due care and attention cannot be a sufficient cause. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay, the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. In todays complex world of gi