Order condoning delay not challenged separately.

This civil revision petition is preferred against the order dated 27. 1986 passed in M.A.No.54 of 1984 by the learned Appellate Authority under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), reversing the order dated 18. 1984 passed by the Rent Controller in I.A.No.10 of 1984 in H.R.C.O.P.No.90 of 1982. The point for consideration is as to whether the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceeding filed for setting aside the exparte order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller passed an ex parte order of eviction on 110. 1983. An application to set aside the ex parte order of eviction was filed under Rule 18(3) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). There was a delay in filing the said application. Therefore, an application to condone the delay in filing was also filed. The Rent Controller applied Sec.5 of the Limitation Act. Condoned the delay and also held that there was sufficient cause for the absence of the respondent. Accordingly, he set aside the ex parte order of eviction.

2. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, the landlord went up in Miscellaneous Appeal No.54 of 1984 before the appellate authority. It may be pointed out here that no appeal or revision was preferred against the order condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the exparte order of eviction. The appellate authority has held that the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act are not attracted to the proceedings under Rule 18 of the Rules, as the Rent Controller is not a court, but a persona designata. Hence, the order passed by the Rent Controller condoning the delay in entertaining an application for setting aside the exparte decree filed beyond the period of limitation is non est. As such, he set aside the order of Rent Controller and confirmed the ex parte order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on 110. 1983.

3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Rent Controller is court and not a persona designata and the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act are not excluded. It is contended that the appellate authority Is not right in holding that the appellate authority is not right in holding that the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceeding under Rule 18 of the Rules.

4. On the contrary, it is contended by the learned counsel for the landlord that Rent Controller is a persona designata he is not a court. Further, Rule 18 of the Rules specifically provides the period during which an application has to be filed for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction. When the rule specifically provides a time limit for filing an application and does not provide for condon-ing the delay if an application is filed beyond the prescribed period and at the same time, the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act are not expressly extended to such proceeding, it follows that Sec.5 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to the proceeding governed by Rule 18 of the Rules. 5. Therefore, the first question that has to be determined is as to whether the Rent Controller exercising the power under the Act, functions as a court or not. The powers conferred upon the Rent Controller as contained in Secs.5, 6, 14, 15 and 17 would go to show that the Rent Controller exercise the powers of a court. He adjudicates the rights of the landlord and the tenant in respect of the premises governed by the Act. The proceedings before him are of civil nature involving civil rights. The decision of the Rent Controller is appealable to the appellate authority, which is a judicial authority. The order passed by the Rent Controller is executable, as if it were a decree. Therefore, it is clear that the Rent Controller cannot be considered to be a persona designata. Persona designata is one whose appointment is made not w