Dismissal of S.L.A. without assigning reason will amount to declaration of law.

Srinivasan, J.

We are somewhat surprised that this matter has been referred to us once again, though it has been considered by a Full Bench to which one of us was a party earlier and by judgment dated 22nd January, 1992, the reference had been answered. The judgment is reported in Philip Jcyasingh v. The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, (1992)1 L.W. 216.

2. The question referred to that Full Bench was “can the judgment of the Full Bench in R. Tamilarasan v. Director of Handlooms and Textiles, (1991)2L.W. 409 be characterised as one per incuriam or obiter dicta as opined by the Division Bench of this Court in A.Natarajan v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, (1991)2 L.L.J. 296: (1991)2 L.W. 420. The question was answered in para- ‘graph 63 of the judgment which reads thus:

”We have no hesitation in answering the question referred to us in the negative and holding that the judgment of the Full Bench in R.Tamilarasan v. Director of Handlooms and Textiles, (1991)2 L.W. 409: (1991)2 L.L.J. 296 (F.B.), is not per incuriam or obiter dicta and the view taken by the Division Bench in A.Natarajan v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, (1991)2 L.L.J. 296: (1991)2 L.W. 420, is not correct. We hold that the judgment of the Full Bench is a valid precedent binding on Division Benches and single Judges of this Court as well as subordinate courts."

3. The last sentence in the judgment clearly holds that the judgment of the Full Bench in R.Tamilarasan v. Director of Handlooms and Textiles, (1991)2 L.W. 409 (F.B.), is a valid precedent binding on Division Benches, single Judges of this Court as well as Subordinate Courts. Inspite of that clear direction, this matter has once again been referred to, to a Full Bench by a single Judge who had nothing to do except to follow the Full Bench in (1991)2 L.W. 409 (F.B.) and dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable. He has been persuaded to refer the matter again to a Full Bench in view of the judgment of a single Judge of this Court in K.Ganesan v. Special Officer, Salem Cooperative Sugars Mills Ltd., (1992)2 L.W. 406, on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner. Referring to the observation in that judgment that the case was being referred to a larger Bench with a request to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench, which can go into the correctness or otherwise of the pronouncements of the Full Bench in Tamilarasan’s case (1989)1 L.L.J. 588, the learned Judge observed in this case "since already the very decision rendered by the Full Bench in this very case has already been referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for consideration by a larger Bench by P.S.Mishra, J. I have no other go, but to have this matter directed to be posted and considered along with the reference already made by the learned Judge as referred to above."

4. The view taken by the learned Judge that he has no other go but to refer the matter to a Full Bench is not correct. In this very case, as noticed by the learned Judge himself, the Full Bench had already answered the reference and held that the decision in Tamilarasan’s case, (1991 )2 L. W. 409 (F.B.) was binding upon the Division Bench as well as the single Judge. The only consequential result of that answer given by the Full Bench was to dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable. The learned single Judge ought not to have referred the matter to the Full Bench just because another single Judge has chosen to question the correctness of the later Full Bench also.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the question whether a writ petition is maintainable as against the Special Officer of a Cooperative society was not considered in Tamilarasan’s case,(1991)2L.W.409(FB.), and, therefore, the question was still open to be considered by the single Judge. According to learned counsel, it is that question which has now been referred to a larger Bench by the single Judge. We are unable to accept thi