There is a presumption against implied repeal and that the two enactments can be construed as Special laws and apply in the same area and subject matter, the latter will prevail over the former.

The petitioners do not dispute the fact that they had encroached on the Main Road in Mettur Dam years ago. The respondent Town Panchayat had been collecting encroachment fees. In the year 1990, the respondent took steps to evict the petitioners.

W.P. Nos. 3892, 4836 and 4837 were filed in 1991 and these Writ Petitions were allowed as follows:

“In case, the petitioners are encroachers, it is open to the Mettur Town Committee, Mettur Dam, Salem District, to take action against the petitioners according to law, after giving notice to the petitioners. It is also well settled that even assuming that the petitioners are encroachers, procedure prescribed for eviction of encroachment had to be followed before dispossessing the encroachers.”

Thereafter notices were issued in June, 1992 under Section 182(1) of the Madras District Municipalities Act (hereinafter called the Act) giving 15 days to remove the encroachments. Though the Mettur Town is governed by the Mettur Township Act, 1940, under Section 4(1) of the Township Act the District Municipalities Act have been made applicable to the Mettur Town. The writ petition is to prohibit the respondent from enforcing the notices on the ground that after the passing of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1960, the provisions of the District Municipalities Act relating to removal of encroachments stand impliedly repealed. Therefore, it is contended that action, if at all can be taken only under the Tamil Nadu Public Premised (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act.

2. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent it is stated that the Mettur Dam is a Tourist spot and because of the subject encroachments the public and tourists are put to considerable inconvenience. It has become difficult for the tourists to reach the bus-stand form the West Main Road. The respondent denies that the petitioners are in occupation for 15 years. The levy and collection of encroachment fee will not regularise the encroachment. It is stated that on many occasions the encroachers were prosecuted and sentenced to pay fine. So far as the Public Premises Act is concerned, it is stated that the respondent cannot invoke the same because no Estate Officers have been appointed and in any event that Act will not override the Municipalities Act.

3. The only question to be decided is whether the Municipalities Act apply to the case, notwithstanding the enactment of the Public Premises Act. Though the question raised appears to be simple, it involves important principle of statutory interpretation. It has to be remembered that both enactments were passed by the State Legislature. Though there is a possibility of both the enactments applying whenever the respondent decides to remove the encroachments, it cannot be disputed that as on date the Public Premises Act cannot be invoked by the respondent because Estate Officers have not been appointed under Section 3 of the Act in respect of the area in question.

4. That apart the question of a latter Act repealing an earlier enactment in respect of an area of subject matter to which both enactment equally apply, is beset with very many statutory restrictions and caution. In Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J.Joseph (AIR 1963 S.C. 1561) the court was concerned with a public bus stand constructed by a Municipality. The Municipal Council not only levied charges on the buses using the Busstand but also prevented the use of other places within a radius of six furlongs, as a halting place. The levy was challenged on the ground that, after the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act the power of the Municipalities to provide bus stands stood repealed. The argument was rejected. Observed the apex Court:

“It is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication. But it is an equally well-settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeal. Upon the assumption that the legislat