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1996 Supreme(Mad) 24

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. SUBRAMANI
Meenakshisundaram
Versus
N.Rangasami
Second Appeal No.1389 of 1995
Decided On : 09-01-1996

Advocates:
Venkateswaran, for Appellant. V.Srikanth, for Respondent.

Execution of promissory note admitted.

Headnote:Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881-Section 118-Presumption as to passing of consideration when execution of promissory note is admitted.

       

       

Judgment :

Plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal.

.2. The suit by the appellant is one for recovery of money due under a promissory note dated 4. 1988 for Rs.3,000 with interest thereon. Ex.A-1 is the promissory note. When the transaction was not settled in spite of various demands, registered notice was issued through advocate on the basis of Ex.A-2 and the same was replied under Ex.A-4, wherein the defendant denied the liability under the note.

3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, it is contended that he has not executed the suit promissory note, that the plaintiff had taken his signature in blank paper and that the same has been utilised by the plaintiff the purpose of creating the suit promissory note.

4. The parties went on trial before the trial court and, after taking evidence, both oral and documentary, the trial court held that the suit promissory note was duly executed by the defendant, and, on the basis of presumption under Sec. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, held that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed.

5. The trial court relied on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and also Exs.A-1 to A-4 for the said purpose. P.Ws.2 and 3 are witnesses who have spoken about the suit transaction. The defendant examined himself as D.W.I on his side. The trial court said that Ex.A-1 was supported by consideration and that the defendant has borrowed the amount as mentioned therein. The suit was decreed with costs as prayed for in the plaint.

.6. The defendant preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court as A.S. No.63 of 1993. Before the lower appellate court, learned counsel for the defendant admitted that the promissory note was executed by his client. The first sentence in para 8 of the judgment of the lower appellate court reads thus:

7. The following substantial questions of law have been raised in the memorandum of appeal:

"(1) Whether in law the lower appellate court is right in casting the onus of proving the passing of consideration for the promissory note on the appellant even after the respondent had admitted to executing the note, and

(2) Whether in law the lower appellate court is right in overlooking the presumption laid down in Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, that a Negotiable Instrument is fully supported by consideration and that the onus is on the respondent who sought to rebut it to prove his case."

8. The trial court, after taking evidence, has held that the promissory note was executed by the respondent. Before the lower appellate court, the execution was admitted. Naturally the burden of proving that the said document is not supported by consideration is on the defendant.

9. Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act says:

"Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:

(a) of consideration — that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration,... ... ..."

10. In the decision reported in Narasamma v. Veerraju, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 769, a Division Bench of this Court considered a similar question along with Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act. At pages 772 and 773 of the said decision, their Lordships have held thus:

"The appellant’s arguments seem to read a great deal into Sec. 118, Negotiable Instruments Act; that section must be understood in the light of the reason of the rule and the history of the law as to the presumption in favour of negotiable instruments. From the definitions and from illustrations in the Act, it will be seen that it is not required or even expected that the consider-ation’ should be stated in the instrument itself. So, no presumption can ordinarily arise in such cases out of ‘recitals’ in the document. At one time, it was a matter of doubt in England whether a statement, in the bill of the transaction which gave rise to the bill might not detract from its character as an ‘unconditional’ order or promise to pay and Clause (3), Sec.3, Bills of Exchange Act, was put in, to remove this apprehension. Hav
























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