Direction given to State Government for constitution of Committee and to abide by its recommendations.

The Honourable Chief Justice: Admit. The learned Government Pleader waives service for the respondent-State.

2. By consent, the writ appeal is taken up for hearing.

3. The appellant is the original writ petitioner. He has filed the writ petition seeking a direction to the respondent-State of Tamil Nadu to consider his representation dated 1. 2006 for reviewing his case in C.C. No. 1 of 1997 pending on the file of the Designated Court, Tirunelveli by a Review Committee/Screening Committee in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994 (3) SCC 569). The appellant is facing trial for the offences under Sections 120(B) and 302 of IPC, and also for the offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short ‘TADA’). The contention of the appellant is that the provisions of TADA do not attract in the instant case, and the case should be tried as a regular Sessions Case, and hence the State has to take necessary steps for reviewing and transferring the case to the regular Sessions Court. By the impugned order, the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition holding that the Supreme Court’s direction would apply only to those cases which are pending at the stage of investigation, and the instant case is not at the stage of investigation, but at the trial stage, and hence the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh’s case (cited supra) is not applicable. According to the learned single Judge once the trial in a case has commenced or is pending, or charge sheet is filed, and cognizance is taken by the Court, the Criminal Court alone is having power either to charge, discharge, acquit or convict and pass necessary orders.

.4. Mr.R.Sankarasubbu, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, strenuously contended that the learned single Judge has completely misconstrued the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh’s case. Learned counsel urged that all cases under TADA, whether at the investigation stage or at the trial stage, are required to be reviewed by a Committee headed by a retired Judge as laid down in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616. Learned counsel also drew our attention to a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Government of Tamil Nadu vs. Union of India, (2004) 1 T.N.L.R. 429 (Mad) where the nature and scope of power of Review Committee was considered in the context of the provisions of Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2003 (in short “POTA”). On the other hand, Mr.Raja Kalifullah, learned Government Pleader appearing for the State relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam v. State of M.P & Ors., VII (2006) SLT 525 contended that in view of provisions of Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure discretion to withdraw from prosecution is primarily that of Public Prosecutor and none-else and he cannot surrender the discretion to any one. Therefore the prayer of the appellant for reviewing his case by the Review Committee/Screening Committee and consequential withdrawal of the case under TADA cannot be granted.

.5. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, the Supreme Court while upholding the validity of TADA, excepting Section 22 of the Act, held in paragraph-265 as follows: -

."In order to ensure higher level of scrutiny and applicability of TADA Act, there must be a Screening Committee or a Review Committee constituted by the Central Government consisting of the Home Secretary, Law Secretary and other Secretaries concerned of the various departments to review all the TADA cases instituted by the Central Government as well as to have a quarterly administrative review, reviewing the States action in the application of the TADA provisions in the respective States, and the incidental questions arising in relation thereto. Similarly, there must be a Screening or Review Committee at the State level constituted by the respective