2007 Supreme(Mad) 77
High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.N. BASHA
K. Krishnasingh
Versus
State rep. by its Inspector of Police
Crl.O.P.No. 7626 of 2006 & Crl.M.P.No. 1989 of 2006 & Crl.M.P.No. 4536 of 2006
Decided On : 05-01-2007
For the Petitioner:R. Gopinath, Advocate. For the Respondent: P. Kumaresan, Addl. Public Prosecutor.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the right to a speedy trial and the obligation of the court and prosecution to prevent unreasonable delay in criminal proceedings.
Headnote:
Delay in Criminal Proceedings - Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act - Section 4(1)(A), 7(1)(c), 14(A) - The court quashed the proceedings due to unreasonable delay and lack of progress. The court relied on the principle of right to a speedy trial and held that allowing the proceedings to continue after a long period would amount to an abuse of process of law.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought to quash the proceedings in a case registered under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. The case had been pending for an extended period without any progress, and the petitioner had been appearing before the court periodically without the charge being framed.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the case had been pending for over two decades without any progress, and the documents for trial were being reconstructed only after a long delay. The court concluded that allowing the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of process of law.
Issues: The main issue was the unreasonable delay and lack of progress in the criminal proceedings, leading to the petitioner's hardship and irreparable loss.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the principle of right to a speedy trial and the duty of the court and prosecution to prevent unreasonable delay. It cited the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Moti Lal Saraf v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, emphasizing the obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch and prevent oppression and delay in criminal trials.
Final Decision: The court quashed the entire proceedings pending in the case, citing the unreasonable delay, lack of progress, and the abuse of process of law. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions were closed.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has come forward with this petition to quash the proceedings in P.R.C.No.16 of 2000 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Poochampalli.
2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a case was registered against the petitioner for the alleged offences under Section 4(1)(A) r/w 7(1)(c) and 14(A) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act and the First Information Report was registered as early as on 04.09.1986 and after completion of investigation the final report was filed in P.R.C.No.15 of 1993 and later the same renumbered as P.R.C.No.16 of 2000. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that till date even the charge is not framed against the accused, the petitioner herein. The learned counsel further submitted that the case was periodically adjourned right from the year 1994 onwards and it was lastly adjourned on 111. 2004. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that none of the records relates to the case is available before the Court and P.R.C. Case was adjourned periodically from the year 1994 onwards and there is absolutely no progress. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has put into great hardship and irreparable loss and he has made to appear before the Court periodically without any progress in this case. Therefore, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire proceedings pending in P.R.C.No.16 of 2000 is liable to be quashed.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court of India in Moti Lal Saraf V. State Of Jammu & Kashmir Reported In IV (2006) CCR 141 (Sc) for the proposition that long pendency of case without any progress is liable to be quashed.
4. Heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the First Information Report was registered in the year 1986 and P.R.C. was numbered in the year 1993 as P.R.C.No.15 OF 1993 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri, and due to bifurcation of the District, the same was transferred to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Poochampalli, in P.R.C.No.16 of 2000. It is also submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the records in respect of this case were not available and as such the learned Magistrate was directing the reconstruction of the documents for the purpose of conducting trial.
5. I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward by either side and also perused the entire materials available on record.
6. This is an unfortunate case, wherein, the First Information Report was registered against the petitioner as early as on 04.09.1986 for the alleged offences under Section 4(1)(A) r/w Sections 7(1)(c) and 14(A) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. Thereafter, in the year 1993, the Investigating agency said to have completed the investigation and filed the final report and the same was taken in P.R.C.No.15 of 1993 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri and due to bifurcation of the District the case was transferred to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Poochampalli, and renumbered as P.R.C.No.16 of 2000. It is also seen from the materials available on record that the case was simply adjourned periodically necessitating the petitioner to appear for all the hearings right from the year 1994 onwards, but unfortunately, till date there is absolutely no progress at all and not even the charge is framed in this case.
7. This Court is surprised to note that only now after a period of more than a decade the learned Magistrate directed the authorities concerned to reconstruct the documents for the purpose of trial in this case. The materials available on record does not disclose that the documents and records relating to the case were available for re-construction. However, this Court is of the considered view that allowing the