The legal notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is crucial, and the burden of proof lies with the party claiming discharge.

The appeal is directed against the judgment of acquittal, dated 19.03.2001 recorded in C.C.No.297 of 1998 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.I, Salem.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :

On 010. 1995, the appellant/complainant had advanced Rs.5,90,000/- to the respondent/accused for his business, for which, the respondent/accused issued two cheques, dated 08.06.1996, drawn on Karnataka Bank, Salem Branch, each for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-in favour of the appellant/complainant. According to the appellant/complainant, at the request of the respondent/accused, the same were presented on 22.08.1996, 11.09.1996, 26.09.1996 and 111. 1996 for payment. The appellant/complainant has specifically stated that only at the request of the respondent/accused, the same were presented on various dates stated above and subsequently, when again at the request of the respondent/accused, it was presented on 012. 1996 through Bank of Baroda, the same was dishonoured, hence, the appellant/complainant sent a legal notice, dated 012. 1996, through his advocate. After receiving the notice, the respondent/accused sent his reply notice, with incorrect particulars and untrue averments, hence, the appellant/complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act against the respondent.

3. In support of his contention, the appellant/complainant, examined himself, as P.W.1, apart from examining P.W.2, Officer, Bank of Baroda, salem Branch and P.W.3, another officer of Karnataka Bank, Sevapettai Branch, Salem. The documents Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.12 were marked for the appellant/complainant. On the side of the respondent/accused, Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.3 were marked. Considering the evidence both oral and documentary and hearing the arguments advanced by both sides, the trial court dismissed the complaint, aggrieved by which, this appeal has been preferred by the appellant/complainant.

4. Mr. T. Arulraj, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the criminal complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, filed by the appellant/complainant was well within time and that the same is not barred by limitation. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, it has been admitted by the respondent that the cheques were issued by him for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each. Subsequently, after the cheque was dishonoured, the same was intimated to the respondent/accused and subsequently, only at the request of the respondent, the cheques were again presented on various dates for payment and finally, since the cheques were dishonoured on 012. 1996, the appellant issued legal notice, dated 012. 1996 through his counsel. Therefore the time of limitation has to be computed from the aforesaid date and the trial court has erroneously decided the date from the first date, on which the cheque was dishonoured. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision in Jogendra Nath v. Dinkar Ram, reported in AIR 1921 Calcutta 644, where it has been held by the Calcutta High Court as follows:

Limitation Act, Art 60 – "Demand" is different from request for money on account.

Demands properly so called should be distinguished from requests for money on account.

As per this decision, demand is different from request made to arrange for money. The learned counsel contended that though the cheques issued by the respondent/accused were dishonoured, the appellant/complainant informed the same in a friendly manner to arrange money for enabling the bank to honour the cheques and accordingly, as requested by the respondent/accused, the cheques were presented on various dates. Subsequently, after the cheques were dishonoured on 012. 1996, the appellant/complainant issued his legal notice through counsel on 012. 1996. Therefore, the date of dishonour is only 012. 1996, and from the said date, within 15 days, the complaint was lodged and therefore, the complaint has been preferred by the appellant is well wit