The judgment emphasizes the rights of casual employees to raise Industrial Disputes and the burden of proof on the employer regarding the nature of employment and termination procedures.

1. The Writ Petition has been filed as against the impugned award dated 28.06.2001 by which the second respondent was reinstated with all benefits in the petitioner Management Corporation. The facts of the case are as follows:

2. According to the petitioner the second respondent was a casual employee on daily wages of Rs.78/- per day and he was not a permanent employee and he had not put in continuous service. The second respondent was employed as driver and on 09.07.1994, the second respondent drove the bus in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against a tree at the extreme left side of the road resulting in death of three persons and injuring five others. Because of the said accident, the petitioner had to pay heavy compensation. Therefore, the petitioner decided not to engage the second respondent any more.

3. Aggrieved by that, the second respondent raised I.D.No.350/95 on the file of the first respondent. In the said Industrial Dispute, the second respondent claimed that on 09.07.1994 while he was driving the vehicle on duty near Polur, the wind screen glass which had already developed scratches suddenly broke and caused injuries to the respondents hands resulting in loss of control and the vehicle dashed against the tree on the road side.

.4. It is the case of the petitioner that the second respondent took treatment for the injuries sustained by him at Vellore Government Hospital till 110. 1994. After treatment, when he reported for duty, the petitioner did not provide him work and filed the above petition. In the said petition, the second respondent submitted that he reported the condition of the wind screen glass to the depot staff even before he took the vehicle but no step was taken to repair the glass and that the accident did not occur due to his negligence and carelessness. He also found fault with the petitioners reason to deny employment without any charges and without any enquiry.

5. The petitioner filed counter affidavit and contended that the second respondent cannot raise Industrial Disputes under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act and he would not come within the definition of the worker that he never performed duty as a permanent worker in the Corporation and that he was only working as a casual employer. It is also stated in Paragraph 7 of the counter statement that the second respondent/driver drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and he was solely responsible for the accident.

6. On appreciation of facts and evidence, the labour Court held that even a casual employer can raise Industrial Dispute as per Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that no proof was filed on the side of the petitioner Management to prove the nature of the employment given to the second respondent. Thirdly, the petitioner without any justification and without any notice or enquiry denied the employment and therefore it reinstated the second respondent with all full benefits.

.7. Mr.M.Sudhakaran, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the second respondent is only the casual employer and he would not covered by Industrial Disputes Act and he cannot raise Industrial Disputes under Section 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act. He contended that the burden of proof to prove that the worker had completed 240 days of service, is cast upon the workman and not on the Management. He relied on a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Dattatraya Digamber Birajdar reported in AIR 2007 SC 3056. In that case, it was held that the burden to prove that the workmen was engaged for 240 days in service lies on the employee. To come to the conclusion the Supreme Court relied upon a judgment in Range Forest Officer Vs. S.T.Hadimani reported in (2002) 3 SCC 25. By relying upon those judgments the learned Advocate submitted that the burden of proof is upon the person who approached the court with the plea that he continued in service for 240 days of employment. Henc