The main legal point established in the judgment is that to claim benefits under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, actual physical possession of the property is required, and applications under Section 9 must be filed within the specified time limit.

MRS. PRABHA SRIDEVAN, J.

The Appellants filed Section 9 application under the Madras (Chennai) City Tenants Protection Act,1921 (in short the Act). Learned Single Judge, after hearing the matter in detail, came to the conclusion that the application was barred by limitation and hence dismissed the application. Therefore, they have filed this appeal.

2. The appellants claimed to be tenants under the respondents according to Section 2 (4)(ii)(b) of the Act. They claimed that the superstructure over the Schedule II property had been put up by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants/defendants 1 to 3. According to them, the tenancy commenced long before the applicability of the Act as early as 6. 1969, and that therefore they are in actual physical possession of the suit property. It is also stated by them that "Global Agencies" which is admittedly the entity in possession is a licensee and they have been granted permission by the appellant to carry on the business as a dealer of the first respondent/first defendant Corporation. Therefore, pending C.S.No.121 of 1998 for ejectment, this application has been filed in the year 2009.

3. In the counter affidavit, the respondents contended that the application under Section 9 of the Act is hopelessly barred by limitation. A specific ground was taken that the protection under the Act was available only to the tenants who are in actual physical possession of the property and that admittedly, the applicants are not running the Petrol Pump outlet and admittedly a third party is in occupation of the same as a licensee and hence the application should be dismissed on that ground also. Further it was seriously disputed whether the applicants had put up superstructure in the Schedule II mentioned property.

4. To this, a reply was filed by the appellants that the applicants were under the statutory protection of the provisions of Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 (Act 2 of 1976) (1976 Act in short) from 6. 1989 till 35. 2009. The application was filed on 6. 2009, on which date, the Court reopened after summer vacation and as such the present application is not barred by limitation.

5. When the matter was listed for admission, learned counsel for the appellants was directed to serve notice on the counsel for the respondents.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents.

7. Since the appellants had a statutory protection under 1976 Act, as it is a special statute, it will override the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Admittedlty, this ground was not raised earlier. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Vs. Maddula Ratnavalli and others reported in (2008) 2 MLJ 561 (SC), the Supreme Court held that since the 1976 Act is a special statute, it will override the provisions of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act. This was because Section 5(2) of 1976 Act gave a right of renewal, which is a special right and Section 11 of the 1976 Act also provides for a nonobstante clause.

8. In this case, apart from stating that the appellants had a statutory protection under the 1976 Act and therefore, the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act cannot be invoked, the learned counsel did not explain how the provisions of the 1976 Act will override the City Tenants Protection Act. Even in the decision in 2008 2 MLJ 561, the Supreme Court observed that whatever right, title and interest, the company had, would vest in the Central Government after the 1976 Act came into force and that therefore the lease of immovable property would also vest with the appellants. What follows is that if Burma Shell company which was the original tenant, was a tenant as defined by the City Tenants Protection Act had any right, the appellants will have the same right; because after the 1976 Act, the right, title and interest of the Burmah Shell vested in the Central Government and consequently in the appellant company. Whatever rights