The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's authority to modify the interest rates in accordance with the nature of the loan and the provisions of Order 34, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

1. This Second Appeal is focused by the Plaintiff, animadverting upon the Judgment and decree dated 26. 2007 passed by the learned III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in A.S. No.609 of 2003. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking in the party array before the Trial Court.

2. The Plaintiff filed the Suit O.S.No.6188 of 2003 seeking redemption of mortgage and permanent injunction as against the defendants. The defendant entered appearance and filed the written statement resisting the Suit.

3. The Trial Court framed the relevant issues. During Trial, the Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A10 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, one S. Nagabhushanam was examined and Exs.B1 to B26 was marked.

4. Ultimately the Trial Court decreed the Suit, as against which, the First Appeal A.S.No.609 of 2006 was filed by the plaintiff for nothing but to be dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Being disconcerted and aggrieved by the judgment and decree of both the Courts below, the plaintiff has filed this Second Appeal on various grounds and also setting out the alleged substantial questions of law.

5. After hearing the learned counsel on both the sides for sometime, the following substantial questions of law were framed:

(i) Whether the decree passed by the Trial Court and as confirmed by the First Appellate Court is per se in accordance with Order 34, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

(ii) Whether the simple interest of 30% awarded by the Trial Court is illegal and impermissible?

and the learned counsel on both sides advanced arguments on the above.

6. A deep poring over and perusal of the relevant records including the judgments of both the Courts below and also consideration of the arguments as put forth on either side, would display and demonstrate that the plaintiff filed the Suit for redemption and permanent injunction on the ground that he borrowed a loan of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs only) from the first defendant on 28. 1999 and in consideration of the same, the plaintiff executed a simple mortgage, mortgaging the property described in the schedule of the Plaint. Accordingly, the plaintiff also made part payment to the first defendant, who did not maintain proper accounts. Ultimately, the plaintiff filed the Suit for redemption with the place that only a sum of Rs.1,17,380/- was yet to be paid; whereupon the first defendant entered appearance and contended that the calculation furnished by the plaintiff in the Plaint was not correct and accordingly, he furnished his own calculation. Ultimately, the Trial Court decreed the Suit as under:

“TAMIL”

As against which Appeal was filed by the Plaintiff for nothing but to be dismissed by the First Appellate Court; whereupon this Second Appeal has come before this Court.

7. The learned counsel for the plaintiff/second appellant would advance his argument to the effect that very decree passed by the Trial Court itself is erroneous as it is not an executable decree at all; the 30% interest awarded by the Trial Court and as confirmed by the First Appellant Court is against the well settled proposition of law and it should not be to that much extent and as such awarding of interest is usurious or in violation of the Usurious Loan Act and the Money Lenders Act. Accordingly, he prayed for interference by this Court.

8. Whereas the learned counsel for the first defendant/first respondent would advance his argument to the effect that the loan borrowed by the plaintiff from the defendant was for commercial purpose and in such a case, awarding of 30% simple interest per annum by no stretch of imagination may be labeled or termed as exorbitant or usurious or in violation of the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act or the Money Lenders Act. Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the Second Appeal.

9. At this Juncture, I would l