The failure to disclose involvement in a criminal case in the application form would entitle the appointing authority to reject the application on the ground of concealment of a material fact, irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the criminal case.

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Finding a conflict of opinion between the judgment of a Division Bench in P. Virabhagu vs- Union of India {(2005) 1 C.T.C. 420}, which was followed by another Division Bench in an unreported decision in K. Ram Prasad -vs-State of Tamil Nadu decided on 012. 2005 in W.P.No.21671 of 2005 and W.A.No.1963 of 2005 on the one hand and the decision of the latest Division Bench in T. Sekar -vs-Secretary to Government {(2007) 1 MLJ 510} on the other hand, Justice P. Jyothimani sought a reference of the following issues to the Full bench;

i. Whether the acquittal or discharge of a person in a criminal case on benefit of doubt would amount to a stigma on the life of a person so as to make him ineligible as per Rule 14(b), Explanation-1 of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Rules?

ii. Whether the non-disclosure of involvement in a criminal case, which has ultimately ended in acquittal, but in some cases disclosed after acquittal, can be a ground for disqualifying the persons concerned from entering into the Government service?

2. In P. Virabhagu -vs- The Union of India {2005(1) C.T.C. 429}, the case of a person, who was denied appointment on the basis of his conviction for an offence of affray U/s. 160 IPC. and the non disclosure of the same, came up before a Division Bench of this Court. Since the offence involved was a petty offence, resulting in the imposition of a fine, the Division Bench set aside the order of refusal of appointment. In para. Nos. 39 and 40 of the said Judgment, it was held as follows:-

"39. We are of the opinion that when the offence committed by the petitioner is a petty one, it cannot be a bar to the petitioner to enter into Government, while the petitioner, otherwise, is eligible to hold that post.

40. In this regard, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar -vs-State of Haryana and another, (1996 (4) SCC 17), are squarely applicable to the case on hand."

3. In an unreported decision in K. Ram Prasad -vs-State of Tamil Nadu (W.P.No.21671 of 2005 and W.A.No.1963 of 2005 decided on 012. 2005), a Division Bench of this Court (to which, two of us, viz., The Chief Justice and Justice F.M.Ibrahim Kalifulla, were parties) held as follows:-

"12. As observed in Pawan Kumars case large many cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining. In the case on hand also, the so called conviction is based on a minor incident which arose out of a family dispute for which the petitioner has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.50/-. The offence allegedly committed by the petitioner is a petty offence.

14. In our opinion, the issue involved in the case on hand is squarely covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in P.Virabhagu -vs- The Union of India (2005(1) CTC 429) referred to above."

4. Several learned Judges of this Court have allowed writ petitions following the aforesaid Division Bench decisions. However, another Division Bench in T. Sekar -vs-Secretary to Government {(2007) 1 MLJ 510} took up the question as to whether the acquittal on benefit of doubt could be a ground to deny appointment in Tamil Nadu Police Service. After referring to the amended Rule 14(b) of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, the Division Bench held in paragraph Nos.10 and 11 as follows:-

"10. The present case of the appellant is similar to Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary and Others -vs- Sushil Kumar. That apart, if the relevant Rule 14(b), as amended on 30.01.2003 is looked into, it will be evident that the appellant was not entitled for appointment having been discharged on the ground of benefit of doubt.

11. In view of the specific provision made in Rule 14(b), the appellant cannot claim any right for appointment in the Police force of the Sta