The court has wide co-extensive power to implead any person at any stage of the suit as a necessary party to enable effective adjudication.

1. The revision petitioner/first respondent/plaintiff has preferred this civil revision petition as against the orders dated 12. 2008 in I.A.No.773 of 2007 in O.S.No.181 of 2006 passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chenalpattu in allowing the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC by the respondents/proposed defendants 1 to 9 praying to implead themselves as defendants 3 to 11 in the suit.

2. The trial Court, while allowing the I.A.No.773 of 2007 has accepted the plea of the respondents 1 to 9 and has allowed the application.

3. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner/plaintiff contends that the order of the trial Court in allowing the I.A.No.773 of 2007 is wholly without jurisdiction both in law and on facts and that the trial Court has not taken note of the fact that in the suit for specific performance, the persons who are not parties in the suit agreement are not proper or necessary parties and that the respondents 1 to 9 cannot enlarge the scope of the specific performance suit, by making some alleged claims against the defendants in the suit and this aspect of the matter has not been taken into by the trial Court in the proper perspective and that R1 to R9 neither necessary nor proper parties to adjudicate upon the dispute and that the suit is in part heard stage and therefore, the claim of the third parties cannot be determined in the present suit which is outside the scope of the suit and therefore prays for allowing the revision petition.

4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 9 and respondents 10 and 11 submit that the proposed parties are not a strangers and that they have got direct interest in the suit properties and therefore, they have to be heard in the suit for deciding the controversies and that the trial Court has assigned proper reasons for allowing the application and the same need not interfered with by this Court sitting in revision. It is further plea of the learned counsel for the respondents that the defendants 1 and 2 as Kartha, they are holding the properties in trust and they cannot enter into an agreement of sale with the revision petitioner/plaintiff contrary to the interest of other co-owners/remaining owners/joint owners in the property and therefore the proposed parties are necessary and proper parties to the suit.

5. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner/plaintiff in support of his contention that the proposed parties are strangers to the suit relies on the decision reported in Kasturi-v- Iyyamperumal and others(2005(6) Supreme Court Cases 733) wherein the Honourable Apex Court has inter alia held that a person who claims independent title and possession adversely to title of vendor is not a necessary party, since an effective decree can be passed in his absence and no relief can be claimed against such party. He also relies on the following observation made in the aforesaid Judgement at Page 739 at paragraph 11 wherein it is inter alia held as follows:

"The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If a person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title".

He also relies on the decision reported in R.V.E. Venkatachalam-v- Jeel Devanesan and others(2007(4)MLJ 461 wherein it is held as follows

"It is the well settled position of law that in a suit for specific performance of contract to sell, the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives are the necessary parties. In a suit for specific performance it is enough if the executants of the agreement are arrayed as defendants who are bound to carry out the agreement. The first defendant died in whose favour a power of attorney has been executed by the defendants 2 and 3. Thir