M. Chockalingam, J.

1. These two appeals have arisen from a common order of the learned Single Judge of this court made in Application Nos.234 and 235 of 2005 in Insolvency notices in I.N.Nos.187 and 184 of 2004.

2. The circumstances under which these appeals have arisen could be stated thus:

A suit in C.S.No.895 of 2000 was filed by M/s.Sagar Constructions and Mr.M.K.Mathivathanan, who were applicants, against the respondents Sivagamiammal and another for a declaration that the deed, dated 7. 2000 executed by the respondent in the applications, namely the first defendant in the suit, was void and inoperative and also for consequential permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from taking any action on the strength of the said document. The parties to the suit entered into a memorandum of compromise, pursuant to which a decree came to be passed. The said Sivagamiammal, calling herself as decree holder and terming the said M/s.Sagar Constructions and Mathivathanan as judgment debtors, filed insolvency notice petitions, stating that it was a money decree; that they have not paid the decree debt and hence they were liable to answer the insolvency notices. Notices were ordered in those petitions by the Master of this court on 212. 2004. On service of notice, the said Mathivathanan and M/s.Sagar Constructions made application Nos.234 and 235 of 2005, seeking to set aside the said insolvency notices. Both the applications were taken up for enquiry by the learned Single Judge, who on consideration of the submissions made and looking into the materials available, ordered that the insolvency notices were unsustainable and accordingly, set aside the same. Hence these two appeals have arisen at the instance of the said Sivagamiammal, who took insolvency notices.

3. The only question that would arise for consideration in these appeals is that whether the applicants, who are respondents in these appeals, are liable to honour insolvency notices in question?

4. Advancing arguments on behalf of the appellant, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the point for consideration framed by the learned Single Judge was totally irrelevant insofar as the applicability of provisions of the Insolvency Act was concerned; that the Court has misdirected itself in having attached undue significance to the extrinsic nature of the decree under which the claim is stated to have arose for invoking the provisions of the Insolvency Act; that irrespective of the exfacie nature of the decree, if the terms thereof give rise to a claim for money whether in the nature of or on account of mesne profits, damages for use and occupation, maintenance, annuity, etc., the claim would nevertheless constitute a debt enabling a creditor to invoke the insolvency jurisdiction; that when the respondents have failed to satisfy any of the grounds enumerated in Section 9(5) of the Act, the applications filed by them should have been dismissed; that the appellant had sought execution of the compromise decree in E.P.Nos.133 to 135 of 2003 only after the failure on the part of the respondents to perform their decretal obligations and after the expiry of the time stipulated for that purpose; that on the date when the insolvency proceedings were initiated, the decree ripened into an executable decree, giving rise to a money claim, which could be worked out in terms thereof.

5. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that the decree under which debt arose is a composite decree and not a decree for payment of money; that the phraseology "decree or order for the payment of money" contained in Section 9(2) of the Insolvency Act (Act 3 of 1909) would also take within its ambit any kind of money claim whether in the nomenclature of mesne profits, damages for use and occupation, other kind of compensation etc.; that as could be seen from the terms of the compromise decree, it would be quite clear that the