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2008 Supreme(Mad) 3141

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. A.K. GANGULY & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE F.M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
S.V.K. Sahasramam
Versus
The Deputy Registrar of Co-op. Societies & Others
Writ Appeal No.949 of 2008
Decided on : 29-08-2008

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant:C. Prakasam, Advocate.
For the Respondents: J. Raja Kalifulla, Govt. Pleader.

The time limit under Section 81(4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act is not mandatory in a public fact-finding enquiry.

Headnote:

shall - Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act - Section 81(4) - The court analyzed Section 81(4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, which provides for the completion of an enquiry within a specified time limit. The court interpreted the word 'shall' and considered the consequences of non-compliance with the time limit.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, a Co-operative Sub Registrar, filed a writ petition challenging an enquiry report submitted under Section 81 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. The appellant argued that the report was submitted beyond the prescribed time limit. The writ court declined to set aside the enquiry proceedings, relying on Supreme Court judgments. The question before the court was whether the time limit under Section 81(4) of the Act is mandatory. The court considered the interpretation of the word 'shall' and the principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. It concluded that the time limit was not mandatory in the present case.

Finding of the Court:

The court relied on the principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court to determine whether the time limit under Section 81(4) of the Act was mandatory. It held that in a public fact-finding enquiry, such as the one under Section 81, the time limit is not mandatory as it would cause injustice to hold it as such. The court distinguished the present case from a departmental or disciplinary enquiry. It also disagreed with the findings of two single bench judgments that the time limit under Section 87 of the Act for surcharge proceedings is mandatory.

Ratio Decidendi: The time limit under Section 81(4) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act is not mandatory in a public fact-finding enquiry. The interpretation of the word 'shall' depends on the nature and object of the statute and the consequences of non-compliance. The court must consider whether holding the provision as mandatory would defeat the object of the legislation or cause injustice or inconvenience to those involved in the enquiry.

Result: The writ appeal is dismissed. The court affirms the order of the writ court, holding that the time limit under Section 81(4) of the Act is not mandatory in the present case.

Judgment :-

A.K. Ganguly, C.J.

Heard the learned counsel for parties.

2. This writ appeal has been filed challenging the order of a learned Judge of the writ court dated 26. 2008 by which the learned Judge declined to quash a report dated 211. 2000 submitted by an Enquiry Officer after conducting an enquiry under Section 81 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) in respect of the concerned Co-operative Society.

3. The writ petitioner, who is the appellant before us, was working as a Co-operative Sub Registrar (Prosecution) at the Office of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Ponneri Circle, Ponneri, Tiruvallur District. It is the case of the appellant that he was working as a Special Officer in the Arudarupattu Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank in Tiruvannamalai Taluk and District at the time when the enquiry was directed against him under Section 81 of the said Act. After completion of the enquiry and submission of the enquiry report on 211. 2000, surcharge proceedings have been initiated under Section 87 of the said Act and criminal proceedings have also been initiated against the appellant. The writ petition was filed challenging the said enquiry report, inter alia, on the ground that the enquiry report was submitted beyond the period prescribed therefor under Section 81(4) of the said Act.

4. Section 81 of the said Act provides for holding of enquiry by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, of his own motion, on the application of a majority of the board or of not less than one-third of the members or on the request of the financing bank or of the District Collector. In the instant case, the Registrar started the enquiry on his own motion. Sub-section (4) of Section 81 provides as follows:

"The inquiry shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of ordering the inquiry or such further period or periods not exceeding three months at a time as the next higher authority may permit, provided that such extended periods shall not exceed six months in the aggregate."

In the instant case, the enquiry was initiated on 11. 1999 and the report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 211. 2000. The learned Judge of the writ court refused to set aside the enquiry proceedings by relying upon two judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya reported in (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 751) and in the case of State of U.P. vs. Manbodhan Lal reported in (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 912).

5. Therefore, the question which is falling for consideration before this Court is, whether the time limit which is provided under Section 81(4) of the said Act is mandatory or not and whether the word "shall" used in Section 81(4) of the said Act has to be construed as mandatory or not.

6. It is well settled that the question whether an expression used in a section is mandatory or not has to be decided on various factors and the mere expression of the word "shall" alone is not decisive of the matter. This question came up for consideration before the Privy Council in the celebrated case of Montreal Street Railway Company vs. Normandin reported in (A.I.R. 1917 Privy Council 142). Sir Arthur Channel, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, clarified the position at page 144 of the report as follows:-

"The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statutes must be looked at."

The learned Judge relied on Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes" and the portion on which reliance was placed is set out hereinbelow:-

"where the prescription of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the





































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