Territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not limited to the place of issuance of the legal notice, and parties' inconvenience is not grounds for quashing proceedings.

1. The above criminal original petitions have been filed by the accused in C.C.Nos.113 and 114 of 2007 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Chengalpattu, seeking to quash the proceedings therein.

2. The said cases were filed by the respective respondents under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The contention of the petitioner is that the place of residence of the complainants is Pondicherry, the place of residence of the petitioner/accused is Ramanathapuram, UTI Bank where the cheques have been drawn is situated at T.Nagar, Chennai and the Indian Overseas Bank, where the cheques have been presented for realization is situated at Thirupuvanai and as such the complaints ought to have been filed in any one of the Courts situated at the above said places, but the complaints have been filed before the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Chengalpattu, within whose territorial jurisdiction no cause of action has arisen. Since the Court situated at a place from where the legal notice has been issued will not be clothed with any territorial jurisdiction.

3. Mr. C. Jagadish, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was heard on the above said contentions raised in the petitions.

4. When this Court brought to the notice of the learned counsel the decisions of the Honble Apex Court and this Court reported in

.(i) K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (AIR 1999 SC 3762) and

.(ii) Narang Industries Ltd., Vs. Ashok Leyland Finance Ltd., (1998 (1) CTC 229)

the learned counsel submitted that in the decision of the Honble Apex Court, the question of territorial jurisdiction did not directly arose for consideration and the Honble Apex Court has not categorically held that the place of issue of legal notice will confer jurisdiction on the Court situated therein. The learned counsel sought to distinguish the decision of this Court reported in 1998 (1) CTC 229 by contending that in that case the registered office of the de facto complainant was located at Madras, from where the legal notice was issued and hence the said decision does not lay down the principle that the Courts situated at the place from where the legal notice was issued would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

5. The learned counsel further relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) in Lakshmi Travels, Nagpur Vs. G.E. Country Wide Consumer & Another reported in C.L.T. (1) 2007 1116 in support of his contentions. In the said decision in paragraph 7 it has been observed as under

“7. The contention as raised by the learned counsel in favour of complainant that the above judgment of the Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran (AIR 1999 SC 3762) (Supra) supports his case to this extent that giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount and failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days from the notice gives cause of action only at Aurangabad. This contention has no force. The Apex Court, no where dealt with this aspect. What has been decided by the Apex Court in K. Bhaskaran and M/s. Prem Chand (Supra) refers to the basic ingredients, which are necessary for an offence under S.138 of the Act. There is no dispute about this that all these ingredients are necessary. We are concerned with the cause of action in the present matters. The demand notice is a must. But a place of issuance of notice and no payment thereafter cannot be sufficient to file complaint under S.138 N.L.Act. The notice was though sent from Aurangabad, but received at Nagpur. The party failed to make the payment as per notice. Therefore, issuance of notice from Aurangabad itself cannot give cause of action to file complaint at Aurangabad.”

Except the above said contention no other submissions were put forth by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.

6. I have carefully considered the said submission made by the learned counse