The Court emphasized the importance of valid reasons for revising disciplinary orders, the clarity and justification of charges, and the prohibition against reviving charges after the conclusion of proceedings.

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1. The Union Territory of Pondichery is the petitioner before us. The challenge is to the common order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai dated 11.10.2001 in O.A.Nos. 591 of 2000 and 851 of 2000.

2. In O.A.No. 591 of 2001, the first respondent challenged the order of the Revising Authority dated 21.3.2000. The Revising Authority set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority, dated 2.9.1999 exonerating the first respondent of the charges levelled against him in the charge sheet dated 17.5.1993.

3. In O.A.No. 851 of 2000, the first respondent sought for a direction for being promoted to the post of Revenue Inspector from 26.12.1994, that was the date on which, his juniors were promoted.

4. By the impugned order, the Tribunal, while setting aside the order of the Revising Authority dated 21.3.2000, directed the petitioner to consider the case of the first respondent for promotion to the post of Revenue Inspector in accordance with law from the date when his juniors were promoted.

5. The brief facts which required to be stated are, that while the first was working as a Village Administrative Officer in the Union Territory of Pondichery, he was issued with a charge sheet dated 17.5.1993 under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (in short, ‘the CCS (CCA) Rules’). Five different charges were framed against him. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings commenced. As there was some delay in the conduct of enquiry, the first respondent approached t he Central Administrative Tribunal. The Central Administrative Tribunal, by its orders in O.A.No. 639 of 1998, directed the petitioner to conclude the proceedings within a time frame. Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 9.7.1999 holding that none of the charges leveled against the first respondent were proved. The Disciplinary Authority also concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and exonerated the first respondent from all the charges by its order dated 2.9.1999.

6. This order was revised by the Revising Authority in its order dated 21.3.2000 which was the subject matter of challenge in O.A.No. 591 of 2000 before the second respondent.

7. While assailing the said order, two contentions were raised by the first respondent before the second respondent. In the first place, it was contended that the Revising Authority’s order was time barred as the same was not passed within the prescribed time limit contemplated under Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. It was then contended that there was no power vested in the Revising Authority to quash the charge memo and direct initiation of fresh proceedings on the same set of facts by issuing a fresh ch arge sheet. Both the contentions found favour with the second respondent and by the impugned order, the relief as prayed for by the first respondent came to be granted.

8. Mr. Syed Mustafa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the Revising Authority, having initiated the proceedings by calling for the records of the Disciplinary Authority in its communication dated 23.2.2000, it was well within the period of six months and therefore, the conclusion of the second respondent-Tribunal to set aside the order on that ground cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also contended that the Revision Authority was well within its jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 21.3.2000 and therefore, the same should not be interfered with.

9. As far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner the Revision Authority initiated the proceedings on 21.3.2000 or revising the order dated 2.9.1999. On a reading of the Rule 29 along with its proviso, we are of the view that initiation is the point of time which is to be reckoned for finding out the compliance of the said rule for the purpose of limitation. In the case on hand, when the Disciplinary Authority passed orders on 2.9.1999, six months pe