The main legal point established in the judgment is that time can be made the essence of the contract by consensus, and both parties must demonstrate readiness and willingness, including being ready with funds or the capacity to generate funds within the stipulated time.

1. The plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement of sale on 15.12.1983 in respect of some agricultural lands in Karaikal. Out of the sale consideration of Rs.27,191, Rs.5,000 was paid and the balance was intended to be paid at the time of completing the sale transaction. The defendant was bound to obtain the encumbrance certificate and the title deeds at the time of the sale deed and also hand over possession immediately after the registration of the sale deed. In case the defendant failed to complete the sale transaction within the time stipulated i.e., six months from the date of agreement, the advance of Rs.5,000 must be refunded together with a sum of Rs.5,000 as compensation. Briefly these are the terms of the agreement. On 30.5.1984 under Ex.A.2, the defendant issued a notice indicating to the plaintiff that he is ready with encumbrance certificate and the title deeds of the property and he is also ready to hand over possession of the property and that inspite of several oral demands made by the defendant, the plaintiff was delaying the matter. Ex.A.2 was issued to remind the plaintiff that the last date for the performance of the sale is nearing. On receipt of the notice, the plaintiff alleged that he went to the defendant's residence on 4.6.1984 and informed him that he had the balance consideration ready and requested the defendant to produce the necessary documents. The plaintiff also alleged that he was asked by the defendant to come after a couple of days. But when he went, he found that the defendant was admitted in the General Hospital, Karaikal for Paralytic attack and that because of this, nothing further could be done. To show his readiness and willingness, he purchased stamp papers for Rs. 1,600 on 11.6.1984. He waited for the defendant to return from the hospital to complete the transaction of sale. Though the defendant came back on the first day of August 1984 since he was in poor health, the plaintiff was asked to wait and finally in March 1985, the plaintiff realised that the defendant was adopting delaying tactics to get a higher price. After issuing Ex.A.3 notice dated 12.3.1985, which is Ex.A.3, the suit was filed. The defendant died and the respondents who were the legal representatives were impleaded. The trial Court rejected the claim for specific performance but ordered refund of advance. This was confirmed in appeal. Therefore the plaintiff has filed this second appeal, and the Cross Objection No.55 of 1992 has been filed against the decree for refund of amount.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the plaintiff had been ready and willing and it was only because of the illness of the defendant that the sale deed could not be executed and registered. She submitted that the plaintiff had done everything within his power to get the sale deed registered and had even purchased the stamp paper. The Court below failed to see that the agreement obliged the defendant to produce the encumbrance certificate and the title deeds. So the plaintiff cannot be faulted with for not performing his part of the contract. According to the learned counsel, the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration:-

1. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in law in holding that time is essence of contract overlooking the fact that in any agreement for sale of immovable properties, time is not regarded as the essence of contract?

2. When the seller for the property has disabled himself from performing his part of the contract within the time stipulated, whether the lower appellate Court is right in negativing the relief of specific performance?

3. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in holding that the plaintiff must prove his actual possession of funds, when it is sufficient for him to prove his readiness and willingness as he could have raised funds at any time and complete the transaction?

4. Whether the lower Court erred in law in holding that as the origi