The central legal point established in the judgment is the requirement to prove false promise of marriage leading to pregnancy, the intention to marry, and the relevance of evidence including the D.N.A. test in such cases.

1. Chitra, the petitioner herein, being the victim in the case relating to the offence under Section 417 and 420 I.P.C., challenging the judgment acquitting the accused/Ravi Kumar, the first respondent herein, has filed this revision.

2. According to the petitioner, the first respondent, who was residing opposite to her house, developed relationship with her and as he promised her that he would marry her, she shared bed with him and consequently, she became pregnant. Ultimately, she delivered a female child, named "Arul Jothi".

3. (a) It is the case of the prosecution that even though before the Panchayatdars, the first respondent agreed to marry the petitioner on a specified date, he and his parents suddenly locked their premises and absconded, and therefore, the petitioner was constrained to give a complaint to the Police, the second respondent herein.

(b) On receipt of the complaint, the Police investigated the matter, examined necessary witness and filed charge-sheet against the first respondent under Sections 417 and 420 of I.P.C.

4. On the side of the prosecution, P.Ws.l to 10 were examined and Exs.P.l to P.4 were marked. No evidence was adduced on the side of the accused.

5. While the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C, he said that he was not responsible for the pregnancy of the petitioner and that the case has been falsely foisted against him.

6. The trial court, ultimately acquitted the accused, the first respondent herein.

7. Though the State did not choose to prefer an appeal against acquittal, the victim in this case has filed this revision.

8. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the acquittal was mainly on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused was responsible for the petitioner's pregnancy, since, the D.N.A. test, namely, the paternity test, has not been performed between parties, even though an application was filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police before the Court requesting for a direction for performance of such a test to the authorities concerned, and as such, the non-performance of the said test is fatal to the prosecution case. This ground is factually incorrect, since no such application has been filed by P.W.10, the Sub-Inspector of Police. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that pending revision, the petitioner has filed a petition to order for direction for the performance of the said test on the parties to find out the real truth.

9. I have heard learned counsel for the first respondent/accused and learned Government Advocate for the second respondent. I have also gone through the records and the judgment impugned.

10. It is settled law, as laid down by this Court as well as Supreme Court that if on false promise, assuring marriage, the victim shared bed with an accused, as a result of which, the victim became pregnant, and subsequently, the accused did not keep up his promise, then, it would attract the offence under Section 417 of I.P.C. If there are materials to show that at the time of sharing the bed, the accused did not have the intention to marry the victim and he made the false promise, then the offence under Section 417, I.P.C. is clearly made out.

11. Instead of appreciating the above aspect, the trial Court, in my view, made a wrong approach by referring to the minor contradictions between the evidence of P.Ws.l and 3 with regard to the petitioner being taken to the Hospital for abortion. The trial Court miserably failed to take into consideration the evidence of P.W.8 who is none other than the paternal uncle of he accused, who would specifically refer to the extra judicial confession made by the accused to him that he was responsible for the petitioner's pregnancy, because, he had intercourse with her several time promising to marry her.

12. Furthermore, as pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner, the main ground on which the judgment of acquittal was delivered in non-performance of the said