Unnecessary delay or improper delay.

Thiru Alagarswami Chettiar the husband has preferred this appeal against the order in C.M.A. No. 15 of 1968 on the file of the learned District Judge of Madurai.

2. Srimathi A. Lakshmi, the respondent herein is the wife of the appellant and she had filed O.P.No. 143 of 1961, out of Which the appeal arises, for a decree for divorce against the appellant under section 13(2)(i) and section 26 and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 The respondent herein is admittedly the second wife of the appellant, and it is not disputed that the marriage between the parties took place before the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, came into force and that, on the date of the application for divorce, the first wife of the appellant was admittedly living. Nor is it disputed that, by virtue of the provisions of section 13 (2) (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the respondent was entitled to present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree for divorce on the ground that the first wife of the appellant who had been married to the appellant before the commencement of the Act was alive at the time of the solomnization of the marriage of the respondent with the appellant.

3. The only question which arises for consideration in the appeal is whether the respondent is disentitled by virtue of the provisions of section 23(1)(d) of; the Act from asking for a divorce because of any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding for divorce. The expression “unnecessary or improper delay” has always been interpreted as: culpable delay; and as pointed out by Mulla in his commentary on the Hindu Marriage Act, though the Court under the present section (section 23) has no discretion in the matter and is bound to refuse relief where there is unnecessary or improper delay in instituting proceeding and is not empowered to condone the same, it would be seen that the absolute bar would be permitted to operate only in cases of culpable delay. The Court will be inclined to excuse the delay for various reasons i.e., want of means and poverty on the part of the petitioner, her regard for the feelings of the other members of the family and the honour and prestige of the family, her fear of scandal and desire to avoid a final break-up, if possible, and her expectation! that there were reasonable chances of! reconcilation.

4. Admittedly, a wife would be entitled to claim a decree for divorce once it is shown that her case falls within the four corners of section 13 of the Act; but it is obvious that she is bound to make her choice at the earliest opportunity available after the Hindu Marriage Act had come into force and that the Courts Will not permit her to postpone her decision to exercise the option indefinitely. As observed by Hodson, L.J. in Llewellyn v. Llewellyn1, the Court is not to be used as a place to which people can come for redress just when it suits them, and if the learned Judge who tries the case comes to the conclusion that a weapon is being held in reserve over the head of the spouse who is affected, the Court is entitled in the exercise of its discretion to refuse to accede to the prayer of the petition. That was a case where the divorce petition on the ground of cruelty was presented after a considerable time.

5. It is also well settled that the Court cannot be used as a place to which people can resort for redress of their private wrongs unconnected with the breach of matrimonial duties. As observed in King v. King 1 .

“The Court is not to be used merely as an engine for enabling a husband or a wife to retaliate on the other by reason of some injury which has been done outside the matter of violation of conjugal rights of the parties as such. In this particular case one cannot help feeling that these proceedings would never have been instituted by the husband if the wife had not irritated him by the action which she took in connection with his furniture.”

In Leela v. R.A. Singh 2 , the law is stated thus:

“......the Courts ma