Ratio(s) Decidendi-No appeal to High Court directly or indirectly from order of lower Court.

The respondent herein was employed by the petitioner as a Physical Directress in the suit College at the fust instance for the academic year 1968-69. The appointment was renewed for a further period of one year ending with the academic year 1969-70. The petitioner issued an order dated 24th February, 1970, terminating her services with effect from 31st March, 1970, while the academic year came to a close on 4th April, 1970. Aggrieved against this order terminating her services, the respondent filed. O.S.No.332 of 1970 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Poonamallee, for a declaration that the termination of her services was wrongful and for an injunction restraining the petitioner from giving effect to the order of termination. In that suit she filed an application, I.A. No. 331 of 1970, for an interim injunction restraining the petitioner from giving effect to the said order terminating her services and got an ex parte order of injunction on 1st April, 1970. The petitioner thereafter filed an application, I.A. No. 353 of 1970 for vacating and discharging the said interim injunction granted on 1st April, 1970. In that application the petitioner claimed that the order terminating the respondent’s services was quite legal and valid and that in any event, the respondent was not entitled to an order of injunction on the facts of the case. Before the lower Court, at the hearing of the said petition, the respondent filed an affidavit to the effect that she would not claim any salary from the date of the reopening of the said College for the academic year 1970-71 till the disposal of the suit, in the event the Court holding that the termination of her services is legal and lawful. The lower Court took the view that if the interim injunction is vacated, the respondent will loose her hold as a Physical Directress in the College and that the possible injury arising out of the stigma attached to the order of termination of her services should be prevented, in view of her undertaking not to claim salary for the academic year 1970-71 in the event of her loosing the suit, and in that view refused to vacate the ad interim injunction granted earlier. It is against this order of the lower Court refusing to vacate the ad interim injunction, this revision has been filed.

2. The learned Counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the revision petition. It was urged by him that the petitioner has a right of appeal under Order 43, rule 1 against an order passed under Order 39, rule 4 and that the petitioner not having chosen that remedy by way of an appeal, the present revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be maintained.

3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner counters the above argument by stating that section 115 of the Code only bars cases from which an appeal lies to the High Court, and that it does not bar a revision against an order from which an appeal lies only to the District Court. He relied, for this proposition, on a decision of the Supreme Court in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon1and a few rulings of this Court.

4. In S.S. Khanna’s case1, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of section 115 of the Code traced the historical evolution of the powers of the diverse High Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction, and expressed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may he exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies from the ultimate decree or order passed in the suit that the expression “in which no appeal lies thereto” occurring in section 115 is not susceptible of the interpretation that it excludes the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction when an appeal may be competent from the final order and that the use of the word ‘in’ therein is not intended to distinguish orders passed in proceedings not subject to appeal from the final adjudication from those from which no appeal lies. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court took t