The appellate authority in this case is not justified in allowing the amendment at the appellate stage more or less permitting the respondent to seek a review of the judgment rendered by the Rent Controller.

The tenant is the petitioner herein. The respondent-landlord filed an application for eviction against the petitioner on three grounds: (1) wilful default in payment of the rents, (2) use of the premises for a purpose other than that for which it had been let and (3) requirement of the building by the respondent bona fide for his own occupation. The petition was resisted by the petitioner contending that there has been no wilful default in payment of the rents, that the building has not been put to a different use and that the requirement of the respondent-landlord for his own occupation was not at all bona fide. The Rent Controller held that the alleged wiful default has not been made out and that the premises also has not been used for a different purpose by the petitioner. On the question of owner’s occupation the respondent has referred in his eviction petition to section 10 (3) (a) (i) but the evidence adduced on his behalf was to the effect that his family has been in occupation of a room in the premises in question, that the room is found to be quite insufficient for the occupation of the family, and that therefore he requires the premises for additional accommodation under section 10 (3) (c) of Madras Act (XVIII of 1960). Dealing with this question the Rent Controller said:

“Admittedly the petitioner’s family is occupying a part of the house now and if the petitioner wants additional accommodation for residential purposes he could as well do so. But it has not been done in the instant case. So the petition on this ground (for additional accommodation under section 10 (3) (c)) may not be maintainable.”

2. The respondent-landlord appealed against the order of the Rent Controller refusing to pass an order for eviction and in that appeal he filed an application for amendment of his petition seeking to give the correct provision of law, that is section 10 (3) (c) instead of section 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act and add a new para, in his petition for eviction. This application for amendment filed at the appellate stage was resisted by the petitioner and the appellate authority allowed the amendment sought for by the respondent. According to the appellate authority the respondent has made all the necessary allegations in his petition for eviction for the application of section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, but that unfortunately he has quoted the wrong provision of law in his petition, arid that in order to determine the real controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings it was just and necessary that the petition for amendment should be allowed. As against the said order allowing the petition for amendment the petitioner went in revision before the revisional Court and it has confirmed the order allowing the amendment sought for by the respondent. It is against that order of the revisional authority this revision has been filed.

3. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code cannot be applied to the proceedings for eviction before the authori ties constituted under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and as such they have no jurisdiction to permit the amendment of pleadings. Reference has been made to the following decisions. In Abdul Kkader Madjiar v. A.K. Murthy1, the question arose whether the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte decree. A Division Bench of this Court held that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code not having been made applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act, the application to set aside an ex parte decree was not maintainable. In Rayala Corporation, Madras v. Saved Rowther &38; Co.2, another Division Bench had observed that the Rent Controllers are not Courts, and that therefore the proceedings before them are not governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In Fernande v. Ranga-nayakulu Cketty3, Ramaswami, J., has expressed the view that the Code of Civil Procedure was no