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1968 Supreme(Mad) 298

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
M. Natesan, J.
Nallanna Gounder
Versus
Muthuswamy Gounder
S.A. No. 482 of 1964.
Decided On : 06 September 1968

Advocates:
S. Palaniswamy and R. Kallappan, for Appellant.
The Additional Government Pleader, for Respondents.

Lessee can seek protection from eviction under Madras Act XXV of 1955 after expiry of lease under Government grant.

Headnote:Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955) - Government Grants Act (XV of 1895), section 3 - Grant of lease by Government - Lessee can seek protection from eviction under Madras Act XXV of 1955 after expiry of lease under Government grant.

       

Judgment:-

This Second Appeal raises the interesting question whether a leasee of agricultural land from the Government could, against the claim for possession by the Government on the expiry of the lease, rely upon the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act (Act XXV of 1955). The State claims immunity and exemption from the provisions of the statute hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the Courts below have accepted the claim of the State.

The suit property, river Padugai Poramboke land of an extent of 3 acres and 25 cents, in Senappiratti Village, Katur Taluk, was leased out by the Tahsildar acting for the State Government by Public auction to the plaintiff for a period of three Faslis commencing from Fasli 1353. On the expiry of the period of lease, again, at a public auction the plaintiff became the lessee of the land for Faslis 1365 to 1368. Taking the lease, the plaintiff duly executed a Muchlika on 3rd January, 1958 in favour of the Tahsildar, agreeing to pay the rent for the three Faslis and undertaking to surrender possession of the suit land after the expiry of the lease. When on the expiry of the 2nd lease period, the Tahsildar announced public auction of the leasehold right, the plaintiff objected to the auction being held, submitting that he was a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act. Over-ruling this objection, the auction was proceeded with, and the 1st defendant in the suit out of which the second Appeal arises, became the successful bidder at the auction, of the leasehold right. However, he could not get possession, in view of the contention put for ward by the plaintiff. Apprehending forceful eviction, the plaintiff filed the suit, now under consideration, for a declaration that he is entitled to the benefits conferred on cultivating tenants under the Act and for an injunction against the defendants from interfering with his possession of the suit land. The Court below, relying on certain early decisions of this Court prior to independence, and applying section 3 of the Government Grants Act (Act XV of 1895), would uphold paramountry of the provision in the lease deed of the plaintiff that he should surrender possession of the land at the expiry of the lease period, over the provisions of the Act, granting a cultivating tenant immunity from dispossession on certain conditions.

Two questions were argued before me: (1) Claim of immunity of the Government from the operation of a Statute unless the statute in express terms or by necessary implication bound the Government and (2) the paramountcy of the terms in a Government grant notwithstanding anything contained in any statute or enactment of Legislature, by virtue of section 3 of the Government Grants Act.

It is not disputed that the plaintiff could claim to fall within the definition of a cultivating tenant under the terms of Madras Act XXV of 1955, if the Act could be availed of by him against the State. His claim that he took lease of the land for the purpose of agriculture for personal cultivation and was carrying on personal cultivation of the land, was not put in issue. Admittedly there was a tenancy agreement between the plaintiff and the State. Having entered on the land under the tenancy agreement, he is continuing in possession of the land after termination of the tenancy agreement. If the Act applied, under section 3 of the Act he cannot be evicted from his holding or any part thereof, by or at the instance of the landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise. Recourse can be had only under the provisions of the Act. The State is manifestly his lessor. The Act does not expressly exclude the State from the definition of landlord. Nor is the State specificallv included in the definition of landlord in the Act. The Act defines ‘landlord’ in relation to the land held by a cultivating tenant, as ‘the person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part’. If there is






















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