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1969 Supreme(Mad) 222

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
K. Veeraswami, CJ. and K.N. Mudaliar, J.
P.N. Raju Chettiar
Versus
The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary, Home Department (Accommodation Controller),
W.A. No. 114 of 1969.
Decided On : 25 June 1969

Advocates:
A.K. Srinivasan, for Appellant.
V. Thiyagarajan and T. Aravamudu Iyengar, for Respondents.

Sections 29 and 10 are mutually exclusive.

Headnote:Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960), sections 29 and 10(3)(a)(iii) - Sections 29 and 10 are mutually exclusive - Stage for invocation of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii).

       

Veeraswami, C.J.-The State Government by an order dated 3rd March, 1967, made under section 29 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, exempted the portion under tenancy in premises No. 176/2 in Anna Pillai Street, George Town, Madras, from the provisions of section 10. The appellant, who is the tenant filed his objections stating inter alia that the respondent landlord was but a poojari and was not carrying on a business for which he could bona fide require the premises for his occupation. .With reference to that the impugned order says:

“The Government are satisfied that the claim of the landlord that he required the shop portion in the occupation of the tenant for starting and running a business of his own is bona fide. But the landlord is yet to commence the business.”

On that view, the order proceeded on the basis that the landlord had no remedy under the provisions of the Act and exercise of the powers under section 29 was called for. The appellant unsuccessfully pursued the matter before the Government by means of what he called a revision petition which was eventually dismissed on 28th December, 1968. On 24th January, 1969 he moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the exemption. Alagiriswami J. dismissed it on the ground that it was belated.

We agree with the appellant that the ground on which the writ petition was dismissed cannot be sustained. The appellant was until the end of December, 1968 pursuing and we should think bona fide the matter before the State Government. Then when he was unsuccessful he promptly resorted to his Court. We are clearly of opinion that in the circumstances there was no delay and if there was it should have been condoned.

In the circumstances we thought it best that we should ourselves deal with the merits of the appellant’s contention against the Validity of the exemption. It is strenuously pressed upon us for the appellant that the respondent landlord had a remedy under the provisions of the Act so that the exemption was without jurisdiction It is now well settled that the remedy by way of exemption under section 29 is not a substitute for remedies available to a landlord for eviction under the Act. If he asks for eviction under the provisions of the Act there could certainly be no occasion for the State Government to exercise its powers under section 29. The two powers are mutually exclusive. To that extent the appellant is right.

But the point is whether any remedy was available to the landlord under section 10. As we mentioned it was urged before the Government as well as before us. that the landlord being a poojari did not and was not carrying on a business The finding in the impugned order is also that he was not actually carrying on the business and in fact, he had yet to commence the business. In such circumstances, could the landlord have resorted to the remedies under section 10? Sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of that section speaks of:

"If the landlord or his son is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or his son is carrying on."

At first sight the impression the words give, is that actually carrying on business. is a condition. That is how Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., read them in C.R.P.No. 137 of 1955. He observed:

"As a matter of fact it seems to me that the intention is to give this right of eviction only to such of the landlords as are actually carrying on business and who may require their own non-residential building in that connection and not to others who might have had a business or who might think of starting a future business."

If this view is accepted, nothing could be said against the validity of the exemption in question but subsequently, at least three single Judges of this Court were notprepared to place that literal construction, but, at the same time, they did not go to the full length of saying that, short of any tangible concrete indication of com mencement of a business, mere intention






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