Issuance of notice for eviction of tenant if a condition precedent.

The tenant is the petitioner before me. The landlord-respondent filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default in "the payment of rent from 16th October, 1962 to 15th December, 1963. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority found that the default in payment of rent is withful, and directed eviction of the petitioner. But the petitioner, however, raised the question of maintainability of the application for eviction on the ground that no notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given to him terminating the tenancy and in the absence of such notice determining the tenancy, the application was not maintainable and that therefore the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority were without jurisdiction. Though this later objection of want of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not raised before the Rent Controller, it was pressed into service before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, however, held that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVIII of 1960 is a self-contained Act and that the Supreme Court in Mangilal v. Suganchand 1, did not consider the scope and effect of the Madras Act, and he was therefore of the view that it is innecessary to give a notice of termination under the general law as a condition precedent to an order for eviction under Madras Act XVIII of 1960. He therefore brushed aside the objection regarding maintainability of the application, affirmed the order of the Rent Controller and directed eviction of the petitioner as a tenant of the demised premises.

On the above factual contentions I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the default in the payment of rent by the petitioner to the respondent is wilful and that there are no merits at all in this Civil Revision Petition which would require interference in revision.

The point, however, that was again pressed before me was that the entire proceedings before the lower Tribunals are vitiated and are without jurisdiction inasmuch as notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act did not precede the institution of the proceedings under Act XVIII of 1960.

The primary question raised in this Civil Revision Petition is a jurisdictional fact. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that such a proceeding by the landlord without determining the tenancy is not maintainable and that therefore the orders passed by the Rent Controller and thereafter the appellate authority are without jurisdiction and should be deemed to be non est. Learned Counsel placed reliance upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Manujendra Dutt v. Puranda Prasad Roy Chowdhury1. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Messrs. Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran2. The Full Bench of this Court, no doubt, held that no notice of determination of tenancy is necessary before a person could avail himself of the remedies under Act XVIII of 1960, this Act being a self-contained Act by itself. The Supreme Court’s decision referred to above was rendered after the judgment was pronounced by the Full Bench of this Court in the case cited above.

My attention has been drawn to the judgment in Habibulla v. Fathima Bi3in which my Lord the learned Chief Justice of this Court held as follows:

“It is sufficient to state that the Full Bench held that Madras Act XVIII of 1960 has to be interpreted as a special Act, which did abrogate the Transfer of Property Act, with regard to several provisions and that it validly preserved the power of the landlord to evict a tenant on the special grounds available under the Act notwithstanding the subsistence of a contractual tenancy, not determined by a statutory notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned Counsel for the tenant (Revision Petitioner) does not claim that this decision of the Full Bench has been subsequently dissented from in any