Ramamurti, J.-I have perused the judgment of my learned brother ; with respect, I entirely agree with his reasonings and conclusions. The only justification for my writting a separate judgment is (as Lord Campbell observed in Piers v. Piers,1 the tremendous responsibility that is cast upon us while rendering this decision which will have grave and serious consequences upon the status of child. We have bestowed anxious and careful thought over all the aspects of the matter and have reached the clear conclusion that applying all the standards of strict proof beyond all reasonable doubt, as insisted in all matrimonial cases, the appellant had made cut a case for judicial separation under section 10 (1) (f) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (referred to herein as the Act i.e., on the ground that the respondent had had sexual intercourse with some person other than the appellant. The prayer for a decree of divorce under section 13 (1) (i) of the Act on the ground that the respondent was living in adultery was not pressed before us. In a proceeding under section 13, for decree of divorce, on the ground of adultery, it is necessary that the course of immoral conduct must be more or less continuous and isolated lapses and acts of immorality would not suffice. On the other hand, for the relief of judicial separation under section 10 (1) (f), the party aggrieved will be entitled to that relief even if he proves one single act of infidelity on the part of the wife, she having had sexual intercourse with a stranger. In the instant case, the attempt of the appellant has been to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that his wife severed her connections and left the appellant once for all on 17th November, 1957, after a serious quarrel, that thereafter, there had been no kind of access whatsoever between the couple and that he had not even looked at the face of the respondent, with the result, that the female child which was born to the respondent on 23rd December, 1958, 402 days after the final severance of ties and separation, was born only as a result of the respondent’s sexual intercourse with somebody other than the petitioner, the appellant herein. In other words, the appellant is not relying upon my evidence either of himself or of other witnesses having actually seen the respondent having sexual intercourse with a third party. He solely relies upon the single fact of the respondent giving birth to a female child after an interval of 402 days of the separation or the severence of ties as husband and wife. The only crucial question that arises is whether the respondent left Madras and the appellant once for all, on 17thNovember, 1957, end settled down with her parents in her native village near Bellary.

As against this (omitting her case about the several episodes in her married life during her stay with the husband) the rival version of the respondent is that she-became pregnant through the appellant in Ugadi, middle of March, 1958, that this. pregnancy was disclosed to R.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 on 30th June, 1958, when they visited the respondent and the appellant at the latter’s bungalow in Poonamallee High Road, that R.W. 4 gave her Tirupati Prasadam, that the respondent’s brother Thamma Reddi, (R.W. 6) and his wife came to Madras in August, 1958 along with presents as is customary in the case of first pregnancy, stayed with the respondent for two or three days and took her home to their native place, that the confinement took place in a. Nursing Home in Bellary, that during her stay away from Madras, all the relations of the appellant i.e., the father of the appellant, his brothers and their wives, cousin etc., took active interest as a rejoicing event, visited the respondent and gave her the usual presents and also participated in the Namakaranam ceremony of the child. To prove, that she was in Madras with her husband in June, 1958 (undoubtedly at a time when she had become pregnant) besides her own evidence, the respondent had adduced the

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