Constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 2A.

These two writ petitions are filed by Messrs. T. V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons (P.) Ltd., by its Managing Director, Sri T. S. Krishna. The third Respondent was employed as an apprentice in the company from 1st May, 1364 under order dated 29th April, 1964 for a specific period of twelve months. After the period of apprenticeship, the third respondent was taken as a probationer under a fresh contract of service as a Probationary Technical Assistant with effect from 1st May, 1965. There was an enquiry regarding the misconduct of the third respondent, and his probation was terminated by an order dated 3rd February, 1966. The Labour Officer, Tirunelveli, sent a conciliation report on 31st December, 1966 to the Government and on consideration thereof, the Government passed its order dated 24th February, 1967 declining to make a reference. Subsequently, on 6th July, 1967 the Government referred the matter for adjudication.

In these petitions the main contention that is raised is that section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is ultra vires and void and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. As the validity of a Central-enactment was questioned, notice was given to the Attorney Ceneral and the matter comes up for final disposal.

Mr. V. K. Thiruvenkatachari, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament. Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act runs thus:-

“Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an indvidual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination, shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute.”

By the amendment, a dispute between a workman and his employer is deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute. Before the introduction of this amendment, ‘industrial dispute’ was defined under section 2 (k) as meaning ‘any dispute or difference between employers and workmen. ‘Industrial dispute between employers and workmen had been understood as something more than an individual dispute between a worker or a few workers and the employer. It must be a collective dispute, a dispute between the employer on the one hand and the entire establishment or a part of the establishment on the other hand in which case it is reasonable to presume that at least a substantial number of the employees in the establishment as a whole or in the concerned part of the establishment should be at dispute — vide Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal1. The same view is taken in R. v. Industrial Dispute Tribunal2, that the dispute should be between a body of workmen and the management and not merely a dispute between a single workman and his employer. By this amendment, a dispute between a single workman and the management is deemed to be an industrial dispute.

The contention of Mr. V. K. Thiruvenkatachari, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that Parliament has no power to convert an individual dispute into an industrial dispute. Entry 22 in List III, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India is “ Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes.” It is submitted that the term “industrial dispute” has acquired a specific meaning in law as a dispute between a body of workmen and the mangement and Entry 22 in List III cannot be construed as empowering the Parliament to legislate on disputes between a single workman and the management. Referring to Entry 7, List III, it was submitted that Parliament may legislate regarding ‘contracts’ but Entry 22 in List III may not be wide enough to empower Parliament to legislate on individual disputes also. The meaning of the word “ deemed” which is u