Veeraswami, O.C.J.-

This Appeal arises from an order of Kailasam, J., dismissing in limine the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of the State Government, dated 16th November, 1967 granting to the first respondent a permit und.er section 5 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, read with the Government of India Notification G.S.R. 512, dated 22nd April, 1959 for establishing a new rice mill at Enadhi village, Pattukottai Taluk. The first respondent applied for a permit on 8th November, 1966, the site was approved on 10th January, 1967 and it would appear that the Panchayat Union Council gave its permission for granting of a licence on 13th March, 1967. The permit issued to the first respondent prescribed a period within which he should establish the rice mill. It is stated that since then the first respondent has put up the construction and installed a mill thereby incurring a heavy expenditure. The appellant representing a local temple which is 65 feet removed from the site on which the rice mill is located, raised certain objections which are also supported by some of the villagers who were worshippers. The objections were that the establishment of the rice mill so near the temple would cause inconvenience to the worshippers particularly at the time of the festival. Further, if decortication were to be permitted, the vibration emanating would affect the temple building. The impugned order of the Government granting the permit is silent about the objections. But the preamble to the order shows that the District Revenue Officer’s report, dated 31st July, 1967 had been referred before the decision to grant the permit was arrived at. Kailasam, J., in dismissing the writ petition in limine stated that he did so in view of the decision of this Court in W.P. Nos. 2132 and 2298 of 1966. Those cases related to rice mill permits, as in the present appeal. The learned Judge took the view that an order granting permit was an administrative order and that the petitioners in those cases could not, in any case, be regarded as aggrieved.

Mr. G. Ramaswami for the appellant contends that an order under section 5 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, is having regard to the nature of the power, a quasi-judicial order and that the appellant being an objector is also a person aggrieved. He says that inasmuch as the impugned order of the Government does not ex facie show that the objection had been dealt with and does not give reasons for rejecting them, it is as a quasi-judicial order, vitiated, which,for that reason, can be removed by this Court by certiorari. In support of his contention as to the nature of the power or jurisdiction of the Government under section 5, he has invited our attention to certain decided cases to show whether the power or jurisdiction is quasi-judicial in character will depend upon its nature, the manner of its exercise and how it affects the rights of parties. The proposition formulated in that broad manner is unexceptionable. A power can be said to be quasi-judicial in character, if it confers authority to decide rights or liabilities which affect parties, and the statute which confers the power also indicates that there is a duty in exercising the power to act quasi-judicially. Board of High School v. Ghanshyam1, observes:

"The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. A duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively."

In Ridge v. Baldwin2, the second requirement of duty to act judicially was considered to be unnecessary in re

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