Transfer had necessary power on the date of execution.

The Plaintiff in this suit filed O.P. No. 35 of 1966 for the grant of Letters of Administration with the will annexed to the property and credits of he deceased father Rayapadi Nallasubbaiya under section 232 of the Indian Succession Act and under the relevant rules framed in the Original Side of this Court It was sought to be proved in the common form but as persons interested came on record and attacked the validity of the will, it because necessary for the plaintiff to prove, the will in solemn form. The defendant having entered a caveat and opposed the grant, the Original Petition was converted into a Testamentary Original Suit, T.O. S. No. 7 of 1966, and this is the suit which is now being adjudicated upon

The plaintiff’s case is that Exhibit P-2 is the last will and testament of her father Rayapadi Nallasubbaiya and the said will was executed by him duly at Madras on the 16th day of February, 1955 in the presence of witnesses and the same has also been registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar of Sowcarpet as Document No. 3 of 1955 in Book III. The deceased left, besides the plaintiff, another daughter Chengammal who is the defendant in this action. The plaintiff states that the will having been executed in accordance with the presented mandates of the statute she is entitled to the grant as prayed for. The defendant, however, filed a written statement stating that the grant ought not to be made in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that no will as alleged by the plaintiff was executed by the deceased and even if it was so executed by the deceased, it was under the influence of the plaintiff and the will was not executed whilst the deceased was in a free and disposing state of mind. Her main grievance is that as no provision has been made to her and as there is no reason for such differentiation, there is a presumption that the will have been brought about by the undue influence brought to bear upon the deceased by the plaintiff, her husband and others. Hesitantly the defendant pleaded that on the date of death of the deceased his absolute title to the property was in jeopardy as by then the High Court in A.S. No. 136 of 1957, held that the properties which are the subject-matter of the will were the properties of the wife of the deceased. I used the word hesitantly because the judgment of this Court in A.S. No. 136 of 1957 was reversed in L. P. A. No. 13 of 1961, the judgment in which was pronounced by this Court on 7th March, 1963. Exhibit P-l is the judgment in the said Letters Patent Appeal. Thus, the relevant dates for purposes of Chronology are (1) 16th February, 1955 the date of will, (2) 26th September, 1956 the date of judgment of the first Court in which the defendant claimed that the properties were that of her mother’s, (3) 28th October, 1960, the date of the appellate decree in A.S. No. 136 of 1957, High Court, Madras, (4) 19th January, 1962, the date of death of the deceased, and (5) 7th March, 1963, the date of judgment in L. P. A. No. 13 of 1961. I may at once dispose of the last contention of the learned Counsel for the defendant that on the date of death of the deceased he cannot be deemed to have necessary title to the suit properties which enabled him to deal with the properties in a testament. This is an argument without any substance, because on 7th March,. 1963, the title of the deceased to the properties was upheld by this Court and on such upholding it dates back to the date of the will, namely, 16th February, 1955. It is also to be noted that on 16th February, 1955, the deceased had the necessary power to subject his properties under a testamentary disposition and that capacity to dispose of the properties by a will having been ultimately upheld, by this Court, it cannot be contended by the defendant that the will should fail because of an intermediary decision of this Court in A.S. No. 136 of 1957 wherein his title was not approved.

Rightly, therefore, this Court framed the only iss