Specification under Section 4(1) notification regarding urgency not necessary.

The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is to restrain the respondents from taking possession of land of an extent of 58 cents comprised in S. No. 400/13 and another extent of 52 cents bearing S. No. 400/14-A under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The grounds of the petitioner are that the State was not justified in invoking the urgency provisions in the Land Acquisition Act and there was failure to specify in the notification under section 4(1) whether the urgency was invoked under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 17. As early as 20th December, 1961 the Collector made an inspection of the site but it is said that his in pection notes were dated only 20th February, 1963. On 12th June, 1963, a provisional conclusion was reached to acquire the lands, the public purpose being to provide house-sites for Harijans in the village. The notification under section 4 (1) was made ready on 23rd March, 1964, and it was actually published in the Fort St. George Gazette, on 17th June, 1964. This notification stated that the lands specified in the schedule thereto were needed for a public purpose, to wit, for the provision of house-sites for Harijans and that under sub-section (4) of section 17, the Governor directed that, in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of section 5-A should not be applied. This was followed by a declaration, dated 2nd September, 1964, under section 6, in which reference to section 17 (1) was made as the provision under which emergency existed.

It is contended that ex facie there was and there could be no emergency to invoke section 17 (1) or (2). The purpose of the acquisition, as we mentioned, was to provide sites for houses for Harijans. If emergency exists the State would be justified in invoking section 17 (4). But what kind of urgency is contemplated under section 17 that will justify its application has to be examined. It is apparent from section 4 (1), section 5-A and section 17 (1), (2) and (4) that the effect of the application of section 17 (4) would be to dispense with the necessity for an enquiry under section 5-A. Even in case of emergency, possession before an award is made can only be taken after issue of section 9(1) notice. If the provision applied is sub-section (1) of section 17, possession could be taken on the expiration of 15 days from publication of the notice mentioned in section 9(1). But if it is sub-section (2) of section 17 that is invoked, possession could be taken immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 9. An award also could follow only after proceedings under section 9. Section 5-A is to the effect that within thirty days after the issue of the notification under section 4 (1), objections to the acquisition of the land proposed to be acquired could be made by any person interested in such land and notified under section 4(1). The scope of the enquiry would be as to whether there is a public purpose and in connection therewith there is necessity to acquire more or less extent of the land notified under section 4(1). Possibly some time may be consumed in considering the objections after their receipt and in making a report on the basis of which and upon a consideration of which the Government declaration under section 6 (1) will follow. The dispensation of an enquiry under section 5-A can, therefore, mean only avoidance of the delay in waiting for objections and considering the same and making a report thereon and the Government finally deciding to make a declaration under section 6 (1). Such a delay may roughly extend to about a couple of months at the most, a little more or less. The question in each case for the Government to consider when it desires to invoke section 17 (4) would be whether facts and conditions exist or require that would not brook the delay which would be caused by applying section 5-A. A decision on that question will have to be taken on proper material an