Third son may raise objection against alienation done by father.

The plaintiff is the son of one Ramachari who died in 1959. The second and third defendants are his brothers. The plaintiff sued for a partition of his one-fourth share in the suit property, which he claimed belonged to the joint family of which the members were the plaintiff, defendants 2 and 3, and the fourth defendant. The fourth defendant is the first cousin of Ramachari, the plaintiff’s father. It appears that the property in question was sold by Ramachari to the fourth defendant in 1934. ‘According to the plaintiff, the property had fallen to Ramachari by survivorship, and the father Ramachari could not sell the property except for necessity or benefit or for the discharge of any antecedent debt, none of which obtains in the case. The sale in 1934 was an oral sale, which, however, was confirmed by a written document executed in 1957 by Ramachari, the plaintiff’s father, and defendants 2 and 3, his brothers. It may also be stated that the plaintiff was born in 1939, long after the impugned sale of 1934. But plaintiff claims that he has nevertheless the right to question the alienation, his brothers, the second and third defendants, having been in existence on the date of the impugned sale.

The contesting defendant is the fourth defendant. According to him, and these facts are not disputed, the grandfather of the plaintiff, one Venkatachalapathi Iyer, had two brothers. The fourth defendant is the son of one of the brothers. The third brother Perumal, became an insolvent. In the sale of Perumal’s properties, Ramachari, the father of the plaintiff, one Subbarama Iyer, the deceased brother of Ramachari, and the fourth defendant himself jointly purchased the properties benami in the name of one Krishna Iyer. The fourth defendant contributed a sum of Rs. 274 for this purchase. Later, the nominal purchaser Krishna Iyer executed a release in favour of the three real owners. Subbarama Iyer died in 1948 and his share passed to Ramachari by survivorship. The result was that Ramachari and the fourth defendant were the joint owners of this property. Ramachari agreed to convey the suit property, which is D.No. 27, to the fourth defendant, the consideration being the contribution made by the fourth defendant for the purchase of the insolvent’s property. Virtually, therefore, Ramachari obtained for the family the fourth defendant’s interest in that property which was purchased in the Courtauction in consideration of which he conveyed D.No. 27 to the fourth defendant. Ever since then, and this was in 1934, the fourth defendant had been in enjoyment of the property, getting the registry transferred in his name and paying the taxes therefor. The consideration was valid and the sale was also claimed to be for the benefit of the family. This oral sale of 1934 was confirmed by the execution of a regular document in 1957 by Ramachari and by defendants 2 and 3, his sons who had attained majority by them. At the same time, the fourth defendant executed a release document giving up his interest in the item purchased in Court-auction.

The trial Court was satisfied that the oral sale of the year 1934 is true. Indeed, the plaintiff himself did not deny that transaction. It further held that in whatever manner the fourth defendant might have come into possession of the property, there was no doubt that from 1934 down to the present day, he had been in exclusive possession thereof and had perfected title by adverse possession. It held further that the plaintiff was born long after the sale. His two brothers, the second and third defendants, became majors in 1948 and 1950 respectively. They were competent to question the validity of the transaction and had not chosen to do so. Their right to question the transaction came to an end long ago. The trial Court was of the view that in these circumstances, the plaintiffs could not claim a further extension of the period of limitation in his favour and accordingly that the suit was barred by limitatio