Taking of different conclusions of proved facts open to District Judge.

This is an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise the order of the learned District Judge of Coimbatore in C.R.P. No. 1052 of 1962. The learned District Judge allowed a revision by the landlord against the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Ootacamund in C.M.A. No. 2 of 1962, by which the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the order of the House Rent Controller in H.R.C. No. 69 of 1960, and held that there was no wilful default by the tenant justifying his eviction. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that there was wilful default and so allowed the revision. Realising the limitations of section 115, Civil Procedure Code, Mr. A. K. Sreeraman, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the learned District Judge in so far as he differed from the Subordinate Judge and held that there was wilful default in the payment of rent by the tenant was either exercising a jurisdiction not vested in him or acted with material irregularity and therefore this Court in exercise of its powers under section 115, Civil Procedure Code should interfere.

I am afraid the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as to the ambit of section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are not justified by the wording of that section. He has referred me to two decisions of this Court, one of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in C.R.P. No. 1420 of 1954 and another by Rajamannar, C.J., in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu1. In the case decided by Rajamannar, C.J., he extracts with approval a paragraph from the judgment of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., which reads thus:

“ The only proper way of defining the relative jurisdiction of the appellate and revisional authorities constituted under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is to hold that while an appellate authority is entitled to examine every question of fact and law dealt with, in or arising out of, an order of the Rent Controller a revisional authority, while undoubtedly can interfere with the questions of law, Where the Rent Control Act or any provision has been misconstrued, cannot normally interfere with findings of fact unless (a) there were no other materials on which such a finding could be based ; or (b) the finding has been reached by a consideration of irrelevant or inadmissible matter ; or (c) it is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion ; or (d) the finding had been reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter. To hold that a revisional authority could interfere with findings of fact of an appellate authority without regard to these limitations would be to convert a revision into a regular appeal and to obliterate the distinction between appeals and revisions which the Act has taken care to provide.”

With great respect to the learned Judges, I cannot help feeling that both their Lord ships have not considered the words of section 12 (b) of the old Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, or section 25 of the present Act, which enable the District Court in the case of mofussil cases and the High Court in cases arising in the city to consider the lower Court’s order with regard to its legality, propriety and regularity. There is no reference in either of the two judgments, to the exact implications of these words.

The implications of the word ‘propriety ‘have been considered by the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. Government of Madras1, thus:

‘The word ‘Propriety ‘has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII) it has been stated to mean fitness ; appropriateness ; aptitude ; suitability ; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions ; conformity with requirements, rules or principle; rightness, correctness, ‘justness, accuracy’. If the State Government was of the opinion that respondent 2 had better facilities for operation than the appellant and