Tenant can seek restoration.

This is a petition under section 6-B of Madras Act XXV of 1955 to revise the Order of the Revenue Court, Kumbakonam, in P.No. 1319 of 1963. The tenant is the petitioner. The landlord filed the application under section 3 (4) (a) of the Act for eviction of the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent. The Revenue Court ordered the tenant to pay the arrears by 30th January, 1964, and to report to the Court on 31st January, 1964. The tenant actually paid the arrears of rent on 31st January, 1964, and on objection taken by the landlord, the Revenue Court refused to excuse the delay of one day in the payment of arrears and ordered eviction. It appears that pursuant to the order of eviction the tenant has also been evicted.

The first question for consideration is whether the Revenue Court had the power to excuse the delay of one day in payment of the arrears of rent. It has now been held by a Bench of this Court that the Revenue Court could do so, even when the original order provided for eviction on failure to pay the rent in time and even if the application to excuse delay is filed after the expiry of the period. There have been cases where when the matter came up on revision before this Court, this Court itself has excused the delay. I consider that in the interests of justice, this delay of one day may be excused, and I hold accordingly.

The next point is whether the tenant having been already evicted from his holding in pursuance of the order passed against him, he could get back possession of the property even if he succeeds in getting the order of eviction passed against him set aside It is contended for the respondent that the Revenue Court not being an ordinary civil Court, has no power to order restitution. It is well-known that the power of a civil Court to order restitution is not wholly governed by section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The real basis for the power of Court to order restitution is that a person who has obtained benefit under an order of Court which is subsequently found to be wrong, should not be allowed to retain the benefit which he had obtained under the wrong order. As I mentioned already, it has been held that civil Courts have powers to order restitution even where the matter does not fall within the four corners of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As regards Tribunals though it is true that Tribunals have normally no power than those which the statute confers on them and the Tribunals have no inherent power as such, they have such powers as are necessary for their proper working: see Zukeria Suleman v. Collector Yeotmal1In that decision it was held that in order to facilitate and further the beneficient purposes of the enactment, even though no such power can be found in the express provision of the statute, the Court must by necessary implication hold that such a power exists. The learned Judges referred to the statement of the law in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 106, wherein it is observed:

" If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out.

The Cultivating Tenants Protection Act was a beneficient piece of legislation intended to protect cultivating tenants from eviction. The Act goes so far as to provide in sub-section (5) of section 4 that any cultivating tenant who after the commencement of the Act has been evicted, except under the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 3, shall be entitled to apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer within two months from the date of such eviction or within two months from the. date of coming into force of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956 for the restoration to him of the possess