Provisions of Section 14 if would enlarge an estate acquired with limited interest.

This Second Appeal involves the question of the applicability of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to the facts of the case. One Guruviah Chetty died about the year 1932, prior to the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937 leaving surviving his widow Thatha Muniamma and four sons, Venkatachalam Chetti, Gurunathan Chetti Narasimhulu Chetti, and Bangaru Chetti. The four sons partitioned their family properties in 1946 under the deed of partition Exhibit A-2 dated nth December, 1946. The family properties were divided into five Schedules ‘A ‘to ‘E ‘. Schedules ‘B ‘to ‘E ‘were taken, one by each son and the ‘A ‘Schedule which contained four items was allotted to the widow of the deceased, their mother, for her maintenance. Under the terms of the allotment, the widow had no powers of alienation of any kind and had only the right to enjoy the income from the properties after meeting the taxes. The four items allotted to the widow for her lifetime were also the subject of division between the four sons, the deed particularising the items respectively to be taken by the sons after her lifetime. Under this provision, the suit property has to go to the share of the son Venkatachalam Chetti on her death. The said Venkatachalam Chetti died issueless in 1954, and the plaintiff in the suit out of which this Second Appeal arises is his widow. The first defendant in the suit is the widow of Guruviah Chetti and mother of Venkatachalam Chetti and his brothers. After the death of her son, Venkatachalam Chetti, by a registered deed, Exhibit B-1 dated 6th December, 1956 she conveyed the suit property which was to go to the share of Venkatachalam Chetti on her death, to her son Gurunadham Chetti, the second defendant, in the suit. It is, in these circumstances, that the widow of Venkatachalam Chetti filed the suit for a declaration of the invalidity of the conveyance of the suit property by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant, contending that the first defendant had no power of alienation of the suit property beyond her lifetime and that the plaintiff as the heir of Venkatachalam Chetti had the vested remainder in the property after the lifetime of the first defendant. It was also pleaded for the plaintiff that the deed of sale was a sham and nominal transaction brought about to defraud the plaintiff of her right in the property. In defence, it was inter alia contended that Venkatachalam’s interest in the property was contingent on his surviving the widow and that, in any event, the widow’s right in the property had become absolute by reason of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. The first defendant died pending the suit. No one was brought on record as her legal representative, and the defence was continued by the second defendant. All the contentions put forward in defence were overruled and it was further held that the sale deed, Exhibit B-1, was a sham and nominal one. It was pointed out that the first defendant got the suit property only by virtue of the partition deed with restricted rights, and that in the circumstances, there was no enlargement of her estate under the Hindu Succession Act. For the second defendant, who appealed as the sole defendant, the only question mooted in appeal was whether on the date of partition, Exhibit A-2, the properties allotted to the first defendant vested in her the plaintiff’s husband having only a contingent interest. As may be expected, in the face of the clear recitals in the deed of partition, the question was answered against the appellant and the learned Counsel for the appellant has not re-agitated before me this aspect of the defence, in my view quite properly.

Mr. K. R. Krishnaswami Ayyar, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant however strongly contended that the property having been placed in the possession of the widow for maintenance, under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, it became her absolute property. Learned Counsel relied on the d