Filing of one application for eviction of several tenants.

These related revision proceedings involve a question of considerable interest, in the context of a proceeding by the

landlord under section 14 (1) (b) of Madras Act XVIII of 1960 for recovery of possession of the building bona fide for

demolition and reconstruction. The facts themselves are not now in controversy, though they were in dispute in the

Courts below. We may now take it as established that the landlord (here respondent) required this structure or entire

building, consisting of several door numbers or distinct tenements, for demolition and reconstruction, so that he could

therein house his own commercial undertaking, which is a radio business.

The Courts have found that the landlord was serious about his intention in this regard, that there is an approved plan

(Exhibit A-l), and that this is a bona fide proposal by the landlord, who is now conducting the radio business in rented

premises, to shift here after reconstruction of his own building. The Courts have specifically found that this building,

which relates to the application under section 14 (1) (b), is situate in an important business locality, and that, judged

from the point of view of finance, preliminary steps, approval of concerned authorities etc. the requirement of the

landlord is bona fide.

A ground of maintainability was urged in this form. Though there are separate door numbers or tenements, as I have

already indicated, the landlord filed a single application in respect of the entire structure, under section 14 (1) (b) of the

Act. It was urged that this was unauthorised and illegal, and that there should have been distinct applications for each

distinct door number or tenement, which is the subject-matter of a separate tenancy. It has further been urged before me

that distinct defences might be put forward by the concerned tenants, and that conceivably, one such tenancy may be

saved by the operation of section 14, subsection (5), and not otherwise. Further, it is conceivable that other unrelated

grounds, such as a ground of wilful default ‘in payment of rent, might be included within the scope of one such tenement,

but not another. Per contra the learned Revisional Authority pointed out the anomaly or absurdity that might ensue, “ if

eviction was ordered only in respect of one or two door numbers,” which may happen, if independent petitions had

been filed against each tenant on behalf of the landlord.

The point here is that the word ‘building ‘has two distinct connotations. One is the connotation in the ordinary usage of

the English language, to which I shallpresently refer. The other is a connotation derived from section 2 (2) of Madras

Act XVIII of 1960, which is a definition. By virtue of this definition, ‘building ‘will mean or include a part of a building

‘let or to be let separately ‘. In other words, the Statute embodies a technical definition, which makes ‘building

‘equivalent to tenement, as ordinarily understood in law.

But this is not the connotation in the usage of English, apart from a technical context. In Stevens v. Gourley1 , the

learned Judge said:

“ I may venture to suggest, that, by a ‘building’ is usually understood a structure of considerable-size, and intended to be

permanent, or at least to endure for a considerable time.”

In other words, it is the unity of the structure and its permanence, which are normal factors in the connotation, according

to English usage. Also see the commentary in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume I, page 347, under the

caption “Building.” In Moir v. Williams2, Esher, M. R., said that this is always a question of degree and circumstances,

but that the “ordinary and usual meaning is, a block of brick or stone work, covered in by a roof”. In the Shorter

Oxford Dictionary, the word has been defined as ‘a structure, or edifice.‘

As observed earlier the connotation derived from the usage of the language appears to involve the factors of a

permanent structure and the unity of that structure.